Leaked Cables: Morocco and Western Sahara

Over at the Huffington Post Stephen Zunes writes about how the WikiLeaks cables illuminate the role of ideology in Washington’s approach to Western Sahara, with a pretty damning verdict on the ex US ambassador to Morocco (now in Cameroon), Robert P Jackson. However, beyond Zunes’ analysis and a few blog posts here and there, what the leaked cables have to say about Western Sahara has, unsurprisingly, received little attention. So, here is an attempt to plug the gap. I’ll try and expand/augment this post in due course, when time permits.

The discussion below is based on two cables circulated by Spanish daily El Pais, and three cables posted by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar (whose website is down as I write this). The latter are from a batch of nearly 200 cables obtained by Al -Akhbar from a source other than WikiLeaks, according to The Atlantic, which concludes that the cables are most likely genuine. Of course we have to entertain the possibility that they are not, although this seems remote. The cables discussed here date back to 2006 – those prior to 2009 (all but one) were sent when the last Bush administration was in power. I’ve included links to the cables available on the El Pais website. However, as the Al-Akhbar site is currently down, and the other cables do not appear to be available elsewhere, no links can be provided for these at the present time (I’m working from versions printed before the site went down). Some cables released by Al-Akhbar are available elsewhere, such as these from the Algerian embassy.

The cables cover a number of themes, around which the discussion below is organized. Cables are identified by a code indicating the year (first two characters), the place of origin (in this case Rabat and Casablanca), and the number of the cable.

Autonomy/MINURSO: pressure and protection

Cable 06RABAT678 describes a meeting with Taieb Fassi Fihri, Minister-Delegate of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara was discussed. The tone of the cable is very much one that emphasises what it calls the “difficulty” of Morocco’s position, and Fassi Fihri acknowledged that the Polisario and Algeria are “probably not willing to discuss” the autonomy plan. One thing that is particularly notable in this cable is the statement that “Fassi Fihri wanted to be assured that the US would continue to support MINURSO even if a credible autonomy plan is not submitted in a timely manner.” The US ambassador is reported to have responded that “engagement between Morocco and other actors is necessary and that a substantive autonomy plan and implementation plan must be submitted or there will be no support for a MINURSO extension.”

Two conclusions may be drawn from the above. First, Morocco sees the MINURSO presence in Western Sahara as in its interests. This will come as no surprise to those who conclude that one of the main roles that MINURSO has played has been to freeze the conflict while Morocco entrenches its position in Western Sahara. Morocco’s desire to keep MINURSO in Western Sahara is deeply ironic, given Morocco’s insistence that the referendum that MINURSO is mandated to arrange will never take place. For those unfamiliar with the situation in Western Sahara it’s worth pointing out that MINURSO stands for United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Second, the US put pressure on Morocco to move forward with the autonomy plan, egging Morocco on in the legitimization of its occupation of Western Sahara.

Corruption: occupation as opportunity

Cable 08RABAT727 addresses corruption in the Moroccan military, which is described as widespread (the term “plagued” is used liberally). The cable claims that “Lt Gen. Bennani [commander of the forces in Western Sahara] is using his post to skim money from military contracts and to influence business decisions”, and that it is rumoured that he owns a large part of the fisheries in Western Sahara. This situation is seen as symptomatic of the legacy of Hassan II’s deal with the military, which is characterised as “remain loyal, and you can profit” (historically, fear of a coup against appears to be one of the main determinants of the palace’s relationship with the military). In this context, the Western Sahara command is apparently seen as particularly lucrative and jealously guarded by a few families within the military. Outside of the military, cable 09CASABLANCA226 concludes that corruption in the real estate sector is increasing rather than diminishing.

Security and Terror: spectres and diversions

The leaked cables highlight Morocco’s strategy of playing the security card in order to bolster its position in Western Sahara, but also illustrate that they are overplaying their hand here.

Cable 09RABAT479 describes how Mustapha Mansouri, President of the Chamber of Deputies, “feared that the loss of Western Sahara would open a vast, anarchic ungoverned space, with no real borders extending thousands if miles east from the Atlantic. Only Western Sahara, under Morocco’s control, was an exception.” Mansouri used some of the arguments beloved of the commenters on this blog, particularly our old friend Ahmed Salem Amr Khaddad, to characterise the conflict. He “said that the conflict was really a legacy of the Cold War and of Algeria’s continued attachment to Eastern, socialist models.” Mansouri reiterated the Moroccan position regarding the UN mandated referendum in Western Sahara, that “self-determination could mean autonomy or integration but not independence.” As usual, Morocco believes that self-determination for the people of Western Sahara means something determined by outsiders in Rabat. No further comment should really be necessary here.

[The above cable was sent in the context of visit by a number of US Senators, led by Senator Richard Burr, to Morocco. The cable concludes by saying that the Senators “learned more about Western Sahara”, and Burr “assured Mansouri that he would be welcomed on Capitol Hill.”]

Cable 8RABAT150 covers some similar themes, and describes a meeting with Mohamed Yassine Mansouri (no relation to the Mustapha Mansouri mentioned above), chief of Morocco’s external intelligence service. This Mansouri echoed his namesake, saying that “no Maghreb country, with the possible exception of Morocco, can begin to control its frontiers.” On the Polisario, Mansouri did his best to have it both ways, saying that “the terrorist threat there is real”, while being “very careful to say that the GOM [Government of Morocco] does not think the POLISARIO is a terrorist organization.” However, he did claim that

“…some members of the POLISARIO have joined AQIM [Al Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb]. Morocco is particularly concerned that should Algeria and the POLISARIO install themselves outside the berm in the no man’s land in Western Sahara, this could become a base for terrorist training and operations, which Morocco could not tolerate.”

We can only presume that Mansouri was engaging in the old Moroccan trick of deliberately confusing the 5 km buffer strip on the east and south of the berm (the only part of Western Sahara that might be described as a “no man’s land”) with the extensive area under Polisario control that, like the considerable large area controlled by Morocco, is designated as an “area with limited restrictions” under the terms of the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire agreement. This, again, is a favourite tactic by Morocco, which seems desperate to deny the reality that Western Sahara is actually partitioned, with the areas controlled by Morocco and the Polisario having parity of status under the terms of the ceasefire, and therefore in international law (see earlier posts here and here). To acknowledge this fact would be to admit that all its autonomy plan will do is legitimize a partial occupation of Western Sahara, without actually resolving the conflict. As for members of the Polisario joining AQIM, well, show us the evidence. To those of us who have interacted with the Polisario this seems unlikely, to say the least. The Polisario leadership would be very unlikely to tolerate any such conversion, given its fears of radicalization among the population of the refugee camps and its concerns about its international reputation and image.

Cable 08RABAT727 rather deflates Mansouri’s claims, exhibiting a clear understanding of the geopolitical realities in Western Sahara as it talks about Polisario’s “small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.” It goes on to say that

“the GOM [govt. of Morocco] almost certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no current threat that could not be effectively countered. The POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist bombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised, there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity among the indigenous Sahrawi population.”

Talking of radicalization, Morocco’s obsession with the “empty spaces” of the Sahara, and with the alleged terrorist threat posed by any settlement of the Western Sahara conflict not in its favour, is put in perspective by the very real and demonstrable radicalization of Moroccans inside Morocco. Cable 8RABAT150 describes how Minister of the Interior Chakib Benmoussa “pointed out that approximately 60 Moroccans had been arrested before they could depart Morocco” for Iraq, and that another 70 were “being watched and/or sought in the country and the region.” Morocco’s external intelligence service “noted that 139 Moroccan foreign fighters had attempted to go to Iraq since 2003,” with a “resurgence in the foreign fighter pipeline in 2006”. 40 Moroccans “had definitely reached Iraq, and 38 of them had participated in suicide missions.” The intelligence service also noted that “Moroccan cells cooperated with individuals and cells in Denmark, Sweden, Span, Saudi Arabia and Syria.” The Foreign Minister “lamented that potential extremists pay too much attention to al-Jazeera,” something that might not be a problem now, since Morocco kicked them out of the country for being too critical of the Moroccan government.

Cable 08RABAT727 briefly touches on the issue of home-grown militancy, stating that “reporting suggests small numbers of FAR soldiers remains [sic] susceptible to Islamic radicalization”, and reminding readers that those behind the 2003 Casablanca bombings included members of the Moroccan military. Following the 2003 bombings, “Morocco’s internal security services have identified and apprehended several military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells, some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for terrorism.”

A number of the cables highlight Morocco’s concerns (real or contrived) about Mauritania’s stability, and cable 8RABAT150 reports that Morocco’s external intelligence chief Mansouri argued that “Mauritania’s stability was more important than democracy”. To the Embassy staff’s credit, they responded that they believed it was possible to have both stability and democracy in Mauritania.

The main conclusion to be drawn here is that, while Morocco is keen to see terrorist threats in Western Sahara and among the Polisario and Sahrawi, the real terrorist threats to the Moroccan state are emanating from Morocco itself, and Morocco is playing a significant de facto role in the export of militant Islam.

Deployment: massively committed, thinly stretched, and poorly prepared

Cable 08RABAT727 claims that the Moroccan armed forces (Forces Armées Royales, or FAR) are preoccupied with Western Sahara, with some 50-70% of its strength deployed there at any given time. However, the FAR are reported to be stretched thin in Western Sahara, with operational readiness estimated at 40%.

Liberté, egalité, fraternité, génocide

News that the UN Security Council “deplores” the recent violence in the Moroccan-occupied territories of Western Sahara will be small comfort to the Sahrawi who are suffering death, beatings and disappearances in the disputed territory. While some members of the Security Council have proposed sending a UN investigative team to Western Sahara to assess the situation and the claims and counter-claims, the Council as a whole has decided to do nothing. It is likely to the point of certainty that France, Morocco’s long-time ally, played a key role in ensuring that Morocco was left to get on with its oppression. The United States is also apparently not keen on any action to address the violence. The UK, which currently holds the presidency of the Security Council, doesn’t come out looking good either.

The accounts coming out of Western Sahara talk of mass graves, thousands of people “disappeared”, bodies thrown out of helicopters, Moroccan settlers being armed and set on indigenous Sahrawi, and Moroccan forces stationed at hospitals beating Sahrawi seeking medical attention, and Moroccan taxi drivers taking them for treatment (apparently not all Moroccans are allowing themselves to be whipped up into a frenzy of bloody imperialism). These accounts will remain “officially” unsubstantiated as long as the lock-down in the occupied territories continues and journalists and other investigators are denied access to the areas concerned. Of course this it presumably the idea in the heads of the French and the US representatives on the Security Council – if nothing can be proved then nothing can be done, and their friends in Rabat can get away with perpetrating the worst violence seen in Western Sahara since the ceasefire in 1991.

This apathy, or rather protection of Morocco to ensure it can occupy, oppress and kill with impunity, is short sighted. If the above reports are correct, what is currently occurring in the occupied territories of Western Sahara could easily spill over into genocide. The G-word is often used liberally and emotionally, in a way that devalues its meaning. However, what we are seeing (or rather not seeing, and only hearing about via reports that remain unverified by independent sources because of the lack of journalists and observers on the ground) appears to be the orchestrated and bloody persecution of a particular ethnic group by an occupying power and its settlers. If the reports coming out of the occupied territories are accurate, the orchestrated persecution has progressed to mass murder. This certainly looks like the early stages of a genocide, and if the situation continues or escalates then use of the term will be fully justified.

France for one really should know better, after its complicity in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. As a result of its support for the Hutu government, and by extension for the pro-government Interahamwe militias, France has effectively been kicked out of Rwanda, which has transformed iteslt from a Francophone country into an Anglophone one. By supporting a murderous regime in the name of retaining its post-colonial (some would say neo-colonial) influence in Africa, France became a pariah in Rwanda and ended up being excluded. France might always be able to count on Moroccan support, but it will not do itself any favours in the wider region by supporting a second African genocide in as many decades.

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Note 1: Apparently it’s not just me that sees the hallmarks of genocide here. More authoritative foreign voices on the ground think so too.

From the camps

The following account from an American living in the Sahrawi refugee camps near Tindouf, Agleria, is worth reading. It talks about reports reaching the Tindouf camps from the occupied territories of Western Sahara, where Morocco is busily (and violently) repressing dissenting Sahrawi after the setting up (by Sahrawi) and subsequent dispersal (by Moroccan forces) of the Gdaim Izik camp near the Western Saharan capital of El Aaiun.  Gdaim Izik was set up by Sahrawi protesting against economic and social marginalisation in occupied territories, but it looks as if this socio-economic protest is becoming a nationalist issue as a result of the apparently brutal Moroccan response.

The account also describes how people in the Tindouf camps are reacting to the situation in the occupied territories. For a long time many exiled Sahrawi have thought that the peace process is going nowhere and the only way of confronting the occupation is through renewed military action against Morocco. One Sahrawi told me that “even if we can’t win, it is the only way of bringing any attention to our situation”.

The Polisario leadership has been trying to contain the feelings of those who want to renew the conflict, but it might prove difficult under the current circumstances, with people hearing of family members on the other side of the berm being beaten and killed by Moroccan forces, and pursued and attacked by Moroccan settlers encouraged by the Moroccan authorities. The one thing all parties involved in the conflict seem to agree on is that the continuation of this festering conflict increases the risk of radicalisation of young Sahrawi in the camps (this also applies to those living under occupation no doubt). This also won’t be helped by the current situation.

Read the account from inside the Tindouf camps here. While they may need further confirmation, reports of thousands of people “disappeared”, mass graves, bodies dropped from helicopters into the sea, and the expulsion of journalists should be cause for serious concern and some concerted action on the part of the lethargic international community. I’m hesitant to employ the over-used term “genocide”, but reading about the reports coming in from the occupied territories of Western Sahara, the word is hovering in my consciousness. The account speaks for itself, whatever your views of the religious credentials of the publisher.

More recent (Tuesday 16 November) coverage from the UK Guardian newspaper here.

Gdaim Izik

There’s been a fair bit of coverage of the Burmese elections in the UK media over the past few days, including the displacement of some 20,000 people as a result of election-related violence. However, there’s been barely a whisper about a comparable eruption of violence much closer to home, on Europe’s doorstep.

Over the past month or so, many thousands of Sahrawi, protesting against the ongoing Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, set up a camp – Gdaim Izik – outside Western Sahara’s principal city, El Aaiun (Laayoune). Over the past week reports from Western Sahara indicated that Moroccan forces were gathering to “disperse” the camp. Reports of clashes were filtering out of the region as early as 24 October, and on 25 October EL Pais reported the death of a 14 year old boy at the hands of Moroccan security forces. Yesterday (8 November) reports were coming thick and fast from activists, Sahrawi support groups  and some international media indicating that such a dispersal was underway (check the ever-informative Sahara Occidental website for links to daily news reports on Western Sahara in several languages).

Morocco appears to have implemented a media blackout – a representative of a major foreign media organisation told me that they hadn’t been able to contact anyone in Western Sahara, or their staff reporter in Rabat, by phone. Nonetheless, plenty of reports have been getting out, including a number in the form of short videos of the confrontation between Sahrawi protestors and Moroccan security forces in the camp and in El Aaiun itself, posted on YouTube. Today the BBC posted an article on its website in which it reported that the setting up of the camp “was the biggest protest against Moroccan rule in 35 years” (mainstream coverage is there, but you have to look for it – most people haven’t heard anything about what’s going on in Western Sahara, and remain unaware of the territory’s existence). Unusually for a mainstream media organisation, the BBC included in its article a map showing the partition of Western Sahara. Usually Western Sahara is reported simply as having been “annexed” by Morocco, when in reality a sizable portion of this disputed, non-self governing territory is actually controlled by the Polisario independence movement (the BBC repeated this cut and paste simplification in the main text of the article). This “Free Zone” is separated from the occupied areas by the “Berm”, a “wall” or series of defensive earthworks build by Morocco.

In a communication issued today, the Polisario claimed that 11 Sahrawi had been killed and 723 injured in clashes with Moroccan security forces, and that 159 people were missing. The Polisario also suggested that the timing of the raid on the camp was chosen to coincide with, and to sabotage, UN sponsored talks between Morocco and the Polisario. After arranging a ceasefire between the two parties in 1991, the UN promised a referendum on self determination for Western Sahara. The referendum has never happened. While the Polisario has softened their line on the conditions of such a referendum, indicating that the vote could include the options of independence, limited autonomy within Morocco, or full integration within Morocco, Morocco has refused to countenance any vote that offers independence. Instead it is offering limited autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, a solution its apologists have referred to as an “advanced form of autonomy”, apparently without irony.

While the mainstream domestic media in the UK is keeping silent on the clashes at Gdaim Izik, there is more coverage in ex-colonial power Spain. El Pais today warned that Rabat was risking “civil war” in Western Sahara. Web news services are also carrying stories about the clashes.

How all this will play in the rest of the EU (if at all) remains to be seen. Unfortunately, and based on recent performance, the EU is likely to ignore the violence, or at best make some limp statement of general concern, as it continues to collaborate with the new colonial power, Morocco, in the illegal exploitation of Western Sahara’s resources, principally fisheries, which its granting of Advanced Status to Morocco was meant to lubricate.

Rock art redux

Yesterday I received a request to appear on the BBC World Service’s Newshour programme, to talk about Saharan rock art. This request was precipitated by a story in Algerian journal Ennahar, about a meeting in Smaara, in occupied Western Sahara, aimed at addressing the problem of the looting and destruction of Saharan rock art. The meeting included the Trust for African Rock Art (TARA), and Malika Hachid, a big name in Algerian archaeology and cultural heritage, so had at least a modicum of respectability. However, one presumes that an international meeting held in Moroccan-occupied territory must have been organised through collaboration with the occupying Moroccan powers-that-be. Given the well documented abuse of rock art in the Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara and the subsequent publicity, perhaps this is another attempt by Morocco to take ownership of the issue. Perhaps not. A quick web search reveals no information about the meeting other that the Ennahar story. Any information on the meeting, or coverage of it, from those in the know is very welcome here.

In the end, the nature of the Smaara meeting wasn’t relevant to my 3 minutes on the BBC. After seeing the Ennahar story as an entry point for talking about Saharan rock art, the Newshour team became fascinated with the vandalism of rock art sites in Western Sahara by MINURSO peacekeepers, that was highlighted in 2007 and 2008, and asked me about that. So the piece essentially became a “news” story about something that happened some 3 years ago, and which received widespread media coverage in early 2008. Prior to the interview I told the BBC that the vandalised sites had actually been restored (more on that below), and sent them links to earlier coverage, but they still ran with the old (and now out of date) “UN peacekeepers vandalise ancient art” story. It was enough to make me feel almost sorry for MINURSO, who were being dragged through the mud again on this topic, when they’d done their best to address the idiotic actions of some of their officers some time ago. I attempted to salvage the interview and do justice to the facts by pointing out that this “bad news” story had become a sort of “good news” story with the restoration, but the original Smaara meeting wasn’t mentioned, and the whole experience was somewhat bizarre. It must have seemed like an odd story to the listeners, although it was right at the end of the broadcast, in the slot that other programmes often reserve for amusing stories about animals. At least it was an opportunity to highlight the wider issues of the Western Sahara conflict and threats to cultural heritage.

Much more interesting than my participation in BBC interviews about old news is what ultimately transpired as a result of the highlighting of the vandalism of prehistoric rock art sites by MINURSO personnel. As those of you who’ve read my earlier posts on this topic will know, MINURSO undertook to ensure that such wanton, destructive stupidity didn’t recur, and to restore the damaged sites to their original condition, or as near as possible, if that proved to be feasible. MINURSO’s responses to the vandalism are briefly summarised in its 2008, 2009 and 2010 reports to the UN Secretary General, the last of which claims that restoration of the sites was carried out in February 2010.

Unfortunately, I haven’t had a chance to visit Lajuad, where the most dramatic damage was perpetrated, since 2007, when we first saw the vandalism, so I can’t comment on how complete or successful the restoration has been at this site. However, I can verify that the graffiti at the other heavily damaged site, at Rekeiz Lemgassem, has been removed, and that whoever carried out the restoration appears to have done a decent job, although this is based on a superficial impression formed during a brief visit rather than any systematic or expert assessment, and restoration to the aesthetic status quo ante was obviously impossible. (A visit in 2008 indicated some rather inexpert attempts to “rub out” some of the evidence prior to any formal restoration, and the logical, although unproven, conclusion is that this was done by MINURSO personnel trying to cover their, or somebody else’s, tracks).

Nonetheless, the circumstances of the restoration remain somewhat murky. I visited Rekeiz Lemgassem in October 2009, and the site had been fully restored then – some time before February 2010, when MINURSO claim the restoration was carried out. During my visit to the Free Zone in October 2009 I spoke with MINURSO, the Polisario, and colleagues involved in the restoration process. No-one, including MINURSO, was prepared to take credit for the restoration at Rekeiz Lemgassem. MINURSO said they hadn’t done it, while the Polisario claimed that MINURSO had already carried out the restoration unilaterally – i.e. without any consultation with the Polisario. The Polisario representatives I spoke with seemed quite put out by what they claimed was a lack of coordination and consultation with them on the part of MINURSO.

I’m still not quite sure what to make of the whole process, which remains extremely opaque as far as I’m concerned. However, given the fraught politics of the region, I suspect that MINURSO felt themselves unable to cooperate openly with the Polisario, for fear of upsetting Morocco (which refuses to recognise that the Free Zone, where the vandalism took place, is controlled by the Polisario, preferring instead to pretend that the Polisario-controlled areas are a neutral “buffer zone” or even part of Moroccan territory, rather than the de facto territory of a nascent Sahrawi state, which is closer to the truth). In order to stop the Moroccans making a(nother) petulant fuss about the whole affair, MINURSO would have needed to appear to be carrying out the restoration on their own (and not colluding with the Polisario), and would have felt that they needed to keep their distance from the Polisario throughout. The Polisario no doubt wanted to have a greater say in the restoration process – they have, after all, declared the area that includes the Rekeiz Lemgassem site a national archaeological park. So, the Polisario’s nose is out of joint here, and they are complaining about MINURSO’s “unilateral” actions on what they see as their territory. I’m sure there was some liaison, but this probably was more about MINURSO informing the Polisario of their actions than about MINURSO getting the Polisario involved (although the impression my Polisario contacts gave me was that such consultation was minimal to the point of vanishing). MINURSO are just trying to clean up after the stupid mess left by some of their ignorant, bone-headed officers, and are, as usual, more concerned with keeping the Moroccan wolves at bay than they are about upsetting the Polisario.

The overarching issue here is, as usual, Morocco’s tendency to sabotage any process that might have an outcome that isn’t entirely to its own perceived advantage. Given Morocco’s apparent sabotaging of MINURSO’s attempts to engage UNESCO in the restoration process (no assistance from UNESCO was forthcoming other than the name of a restoration specialist that MINURSO had already obtained from the University of Girona), it’s understandable that MINURSO wanted to do the restoration as quietly as possible. It’s also understandable that the Polisario are annoyed at being marginalised in the process. As usual, it’s all about keeping Rabat happy and ensuring that the number of toys thrown out of the Moroccan pram is minimal.

Nonetheless, at least the mess appears to have been cleared up, and that’s something.

Rekeiz Lemgassem, Example 1: December 2008

Rekeiz Lemgassem, Example 1: October 2009

Foreign friends

History demonstrates that unpleasant regimes bent on suppressing dissent and menacing their neighbours can always find foreign apologists who are ready to scurry to their defence without bothering to understand precisely what it is they are defending. It seems that Morocco is no exception in having an army of foreign sycophants ready to fight for its right to expand its territory through force and stamp on anyone who might object to its imperial designs. A growing chorus of appeasement can be heard from lobbyists, politicians and certain elements of the media by anyone who tunes into the news on Western Sahara.

The Francophone world has always been keen on Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara (with some noble exceptions), and this phenomenon shows no sign of abating. The latest bare-faced brown-nosing comes from the mayor for Woippy (no, I’d never heard of it either), François Grosdidier, who also happens to be vice-president of the French-Moroccan friendship group in the French parliament. In a article in Religious Intelligence (no jokes please) he is quoted regurgitating the Moroccan line. Here are a couple of choice quotes:

“Given Morocco’s legitimacy on the Sahara, this autonomy initiative, under the kingdom’s sovereignty, is wise and generous, and provides an honourable way out for all the parties.”

“[The Polisario] approach is useless, there is no point (for them) in continuing and they are no longer in the sense of history.”

It seems that French politicians love to talk about being part of history – Sarkozy has claimed that one of the problems with Africa is that “the African man has never really entered history“. Oh dear – despite the benefits of colonialism and the heroic attempts of Europe to civilise the benighted continent, not to mention all those fantastically well-conceived post-colonial development initiatives, those ungrateful Africans haven’t grasped the nettle of historical progress and lifted themselves “up” to the same level as Europe. What a pity Sarkozy doesn’t realise that ideas of historical progress are based on perversions of Darwinian evolutionary theory that have more to do with justifying racism and colonialism than they do with rational scientific enquiry. Unfortunately the dogma of historical progress is still used to justify aggression dressed up as the promotion and extension of civilisation – something else I’ve noticed in the arguments of those that support Rabat’s military push into the Sahara. But I digress.

Grosdidier also claims that the Western Sahara conflict is impairing international relations, and uses this as an argument for supporting the autonomy initiative. As I’ve argued on several previous occasions (e.g. here), this is indicative of a poor understanding of the the situation, as the autonomy plan does not address the reality of partition or the issue of the refugees around Tindouf – as if Morocco would welcome tens of thousands of independence-minded Sahrawi and make any real attempt to come to an agreement with the Polisario. Grosdidier says that “pluralism does not exist” in the camps, but I don’t see too much evidence of it in occupied Western Sahara either.

I sometimes wonder what drives certain European politicians (and I include the UK here) who seem so eager to offer their services to foreign governments, effectively acting as agents of foreign powers with little or no regard to the interests of the people whom they have been elected to serve. After Blair’s stint as Bush’s enforcer/poodle (delete according to your preference), which served only to support ill-conceived foreign policy adventures and increase risks to British citizens, some of us are a little annoyed with this sort of behaviour. Well, maybe it’s just the money, the power, the foreign junkets, or a simple messiah complex.

It’s not only politicians that are busy appeasing Moroccan aggression, and not only in Europe. I keep receiving news alerts from the African Press Agency (with the byline “Unity is in Truth”), based in Dakar, Senegal, which could have been written by the Moroccan interior ministry. A common theme is how so-and-so supports the autonomy initiative or hails Morocco’s commitment to solve the conflict. The border between Western Sahara and Morocco is conspicuous by its absence on the the maps on the APA website. Hell, they could even use a dashed line rather than a solid one if they wanted to reflect its unresolved status, but I suppose even that would be too much for their Moroccan friends.

Another unedifying spectacle is this love-in between the author and the outgoing Moroccan ambassador. Reading it is like watching two extremely ugly people make out in public – a nauseating experience which makes you think “is that really necessary?” (No offence intended to the extremely ugly by the way.)

The Lebanese Dar al-Hayat has also been at it, or at least one Mohammed el-Ashab has, writing in its pages. el-Ashab talks about the Sahrawi’s “popular reluctance to unite under one umbrella”, which he claims is the biggest obstacle to solving the conflict. So not the partition or the blocking of the referendum then? To cast the problem as one of divisions between the Sahrawi rather than one of invasion, occupation, displacement and partition is disingenuous to say the least. He also talks about “the cease-fire which classified the areas outside the security fence as buffer zones in which no military or civilian movement is allowed.” Well, actually, it didn’t. The buffer zone, into which neither side is allowed, extends for only 5km east and south of the berm, i.e. in the Polisario controlled areas. Restricted areas extend for 30km either side of the berm, and no arms are to be carried in these areas. Outside of the restricted areas are two vast “areas with limited restrictions” in which normal military activity is allowed with the exception of anything that would constitute a concentration of firepower. As I’ve pointed out before, these conditions of the ceasfire are set out on the MINURSO website, which Mohammed el-Ashab evidently has not bothered to examine before putting pen to paper, or fingers to keyboard. Not that he’s unusual in such uninformed pontificating (or is it deliberate misinformation?). Using elections as his theme, el-Ashab strives to convince us that everyone (the UN, the EU) is happy to see Morocco “practicing sovereignty in all its forms – including holding elections in all parts of the country since 1978”. I assume the country he is referring to is a putative greater Morocco which incorporates all of Western Sahara, although he doesn’t make it clear how Morocco has been or will be holding elections in the parts of Western Sahara that it doesn’t control. From his statement about “the frequent announcement of the “Polisario Front” that it operates in regions described as “liberated lands”” it seems that he might believe Morocco’s propaganda line that the Polisario doesn’t control any territory in Western Sahara, but this is not clear. I like the placing of “Polisario Front” in inverted commas – usually a sign of hostility.

There’s much more where all the above came from, and I’ll perodically highlight it. Of course if you want a real giggle you can always go to any number of websites whose purpose is to promote Moroccan interests and push pro-Morocco propaganda, such as that of the Morocco Board, the Moroccan-American Center for Policy, Maghreb Arabe Presse, CORCAS, or the dedicated anti-Polisario (and personal defamation) sites such as Polisario Confidential, Polisario Think Twice, Polisario Cannibals and Polisario Human Sacrifice. OK, I made the last two up, but those are about the only allegations that Morocco has not leveled at the Polisario.

All of this propaganda is designed to give the impression that the conflict is effectively over and that Moroccan control over Western Sahara is all but a done deal. The point of all the misinformation dissemminated by Morocco and its foreign toadies is to persuade people that all they have to do is endorse the situation on the ground and the issue of Western Sahara will go away, userhing in a new era of regional cooperation, development and progress. But of course it won’t, as long as Western Sahara remains partitioned and between 100,000 and 200,000 disaffected Sahrawi remain in camps in the inhospitable Algerian desert. Even if Morocco’s autonomy plan is officially endorsed by the likes of the EU, the USA and the UN, the reality on the ground will still poison the politics of the region. And the African Union still stands behind the Polisario and the Sahrawi’s right to self-determination. Morocco may be planning to further entrench its position by invading the Polisario controlled areas once its autonomy plan gets the green light from the world’s major political powers, but this is hardly likely to achieve the stated aims of all those foreign politicians and pundits who are so keen to promote autonomy in the name of progress.

Related link: http://w-sahara.blogspot.com/2008/09/polisario-confidential-goes-to.html (Western Sahara Info)

Human Rights in Western Sahara & the Refugee Camps: Report

Human Rights Watch has released a 216 page report on human rights in Western Sahara (focusing on the Moroccan-occupied areas) and in the Polisario-run Sahrawi refugee camps around the Algerian town of Tindouf. You can download it from this page:

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/19/human-rights-western-sahara-and-tindouf-refugee-camps-0

Even without having read it, I’m confident it will make more reliable reading than the claims of partisans from either side of the conflict, which can be found on a variety of web-based discussion forums, as some of us know only too well. If I have time to read and digest it I may comment on it, but no promises. And it is probably best to let the report speak for itself, unless there is anything specific in it to take issue with or discuss at greater length.

Partition, propaganda and decolonisation

This is just a quick heads up to say that today (Monday) saw the opening of the latest meeting of the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonization, not that you’d know about it by looking at the UN’s impenetrable website. Perhaps this isn’t surprising as they seem reluctant to let journalists cover the proceedings.

I scribbled a hasty “briefing note”‘ for some acquaintances who will be presenting evidence to the Committee, focusing on my favourite Western Sahara gripe, namely that the reality of partition is rarely discussed, with Morocco managing to hoodwink most people into thinking that it controls all of Western Sahara, and all that is needed is a nod and a wink in favour of its occupation in order to normalise the situation. You can download the briefing note here. I may beef up this document at some point, elaborating a few of the details and inserting more references, if I have time, and if there is a demand from anyone who might find it useful. So do let me know if think this would be at all illuminating.

A handy reference to have on your desk when reading the note is this map of Western Sahara (below), produced by MINURSO and showing how the territory is divided up. Further explanation at the MINURSO website here.

Division of Western Sahara under the terms of the 1991 ceasefire agreement. Map from MINURSO.

To my colleagues who are participating in the hearing of the Decolonization Committee, I’d just like to say Good Hunting. Give ’em hell.

Well fancy that…

Those of you who follow the news from north-west Africa will have heard about the alleged al-Qa’ida attack in northern Mauritania, in which twelve Mauritanian soldiers died. The attack occurred just east of Zouerate, close to the border with Western Sahara.

Alle, on the always excellent Western Sahara Info blog, has a more meaty analysis of this incident than you’re likely to find on the mainstream news sources (as usual, AFP are confusing the Moroccan and Western Saharan borders). Alle makes the following observation about how these sort of things might be prevented and security in this rather large and desolate border region improved:

“What could help a lot is a formal framework for Algeria-Mauritania-Polisario-Mali policing, since these parties are already on friendly terms with each other, while Morocco is somewhat disconnected from the whole thing (by the berm). But, for political reasons, that wouldn’t sit at all well with Rabat…”

Certainly more security cooperation between the these four governments would help to reduce the risk of such attacks. Polisario is currently the only game in town when it comes to policing the Mauritania-Western Sahara border, at least in the direction from the former to the latter (they also manage the border crossing from Algeria into the Free Zone of Western Sahara), and their role would be crucial.

Alle is spot on when he points out that Morocco would become jittery if these governments, with whom relations range from difficult to hostile, started cooperating on security issues along what Morocco insists is its own border (despite its lack of presence in most of the areas concerned). Any such cooperation would also rub up against the section of the Berm that extends into Mauritania. We can be fairly sure that, despite its initiative to stop the “empty spaces” of the Sahara becoming a haven for the likes of al-Qa’ida, the US isn’t likely to be promoting a major role for Polisario in Maghrebian regional security. This would send the government in Rabat into fits of apoplexy, and Washington has been an increasingly enthusiastic supporter of Morocco’s occupation, at least under the latest Bush administration.

So, what do we have here? Apparently, a situation in which the potential for security cooperation to combat terrorism exists, but is unlikely to be realised, at least in part because Morocco wouldn’t stand for it and Morocco’s friends would therefore not support such an initiative (Morocco and its supporters would presumably do everything they could to prevent such cooperation).

Morocco often claims that its presence in Western Sahara is necessary to prevent terrorism, whereas in reality its occupation simply makes preventing terrorism more difficult by making regional security cooperation less likely. Let’s remember that one of the main reasons the Western Sahara-Mauritania border remains open is that Morocco’s slicing in half of Western Sahara means that it is impossible to travel from the Northern Sector to the Southern Sector of the Free Zone without transiting through Mauritania, in order to avoid the section of the Berm that extends into the far north-west of Mauritania. The Mauritanian government can’t police its borders unilaterally without making life difficult for the Sahrawi and the Polisario  or increasing regional tension, which it has no desire to do (neither does it have much in the way of resources with which to do so). The Polisario polices the Free Zone pretty effectively (try getting in without their permission and chances are you’ll soon come up against a patrol), but is denied a greater role in regional security  because this would upset Rabat.

Once again, we see that Morocco’s belligerence in Western Sahara only serves to exacerabate regional insecurity and destabilise the Maghreb.

Interrogating the occupation

Last night I ventured into Westminster to attend the UK launch of Professor Abdelhamid El Ouali’s argument for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara, in the form of a book entitled Saharan Conflict: Towards Territorial Autonomy as a Right to Democratic Self-Determination (see an earlier entry). The launch was held in the Houses of Parliament, presumably a symbolic choice meant to emphasise the democratic nature of the Autonomy Plan (a link made by the professor in his speech). In brief, the autonomy plan provides for limited self-determination for the disputed territory of Western Sahara within a greater Morocco, while precluding the possibility of full independence for the territory.

It was a fairly low-key affair. Most of the audience consisted of Moroccans, including the ambassador to the UK (apparently not the one who complained to the Foreign Office about my academic activities in 2004), and a fair few embassy staff. Lord someone-or-other introduced Professor El Ouali, but apart from that members of the Commons and Lords were conspicuous by their absence. One or two civil servants (one of whom apparently advised the UK government on rendition), a previous British Ambassador to Rabat, less than a handful of journalists, and a few others with regional interests were also present. Representatives of the publishers, Stacey International, were also there, overseeing sales of the book (£16.95 – no sign of it on Amazon yet).

I went hoping to raise some concerns about the autonomy plan in the question and answer session that I assumed would follow a comprehensive presentation. However, I was disappointed. Professor El Ouali gave a short, fairly informal talk, the gist of which was that times had changed and we had to deal with new realities, independence was no longer relevant or appropriate as an option, autonomy was all about building democracy and securing human rights, and the fact that things weren’t panning out as they should was all down to those awkward Algerians. No mention was made of Polisario. Immediately after his talk, we were invited to enjoy the hospitality (wine, soft drinks, no nibbles), buy the book, and mingle. There was no opportunity for questions or discussion.

Determined not to waste my six hour round trip to the Mother of Parliaments, I duly joined the queue of embassy staff and autonomy sympathisers eagerly lining up to have their copies signed. After a while being bypassed by the queue of admirers, I took my chance to introduce myself to Professor El Ouali and ask the question that has been bothering me for some time.

The question in question is, what is the plan for the Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara (i.e. the “Free Zone”) under the autonomy proposal? Are these to be left as a rump Sahrawi state, or will Morocco attempt to complete its acquisition of Western Sahara by force, risking further regional instability and conflict? The professor answered that the autonomy plan could only be implemented if it had the agreement of all the parties to the conflict, including the Polisario.

So far, so good. However, he then went on to say (I’m paraphrasing, but this is a pretty faithful rendition) “You’re talking about the ‘Liberated Territories’ – this is a myth. Polisario has never liberated any of this land. it is a buffer zone set up by Morocco.” Needless to say I pointed out to him that I run a research project in these very territories, and work with the Polisario in this context. Having travelled extensively in the Polisario-controlled areas (Lajuad, Mijek, Tifariti, Zug, you name it), I’m fully aware that the “buffer zone” is a face-saving Moroccan flim-flam, a story concocted to conceal the reality that Western Sahara is in fact already partitioned between the two warring parties.

My unmasking as someone from “the other side” seemed to cause some discomfort, but to his credit the Professor regained his composure and suggested that we talk at greater length later on, which we duly did (after he’d apparently checked up on me with his embassy colleagues – apparently both I and this blog are quite familiar to them, so ahlan wa sahlan if you’re reading).

In our subsequent discussion, Professor El Ouali was very keen to persuade me of the value of the autonomy plan, and of both his sincerity and his credentials (as someone who has worked extensively with refugees and at a high level in UNHCR). He, and some of the other Moroccans there, said that they were very keen on the idea of finding common ground and real, practical, and just solutions to the conflict. I even received an invitation to explore the issue at greater length in Morocco – flattering given that when it comes to politics I’m not exactly anyone’s representative, just a blogger with a point of view and some relevant travel experience.

On the surface this is all very encouraging, and the Moroccans I spoke to all gave the impression that they were keen to find common ground to resolve the conflict (and they were all very personable and friendly, in stark contrast to some of their compatriots who haunt the blogosphere). However, I’m very, very sceptical as to how much will there really is in the Moroccan establishment to find a real solution to the Western Sahara conflict.

Professor El Ouali kindly gave me a copy of his book, and I will make good on my promise to read it. Time permitting, I might even write a review. Having had a quick flick through it, I have to say that I don’t disagree with everything he writes. For example, I concur with his comments about globalisation. However, I think we will continue to disagree about the autonomy plan, for the reasons outlined below. What follows is a general argument about autonomy, not a response to the particulars of Professor El Ouali’s book. However, the argument does hark back to his comments about the nature of the Polisario-controlled areas.

The existence of the Free Zone and of the exiled Sahrawi refugees in the camps around Tindouf together represent a very serious stumbling block to the autonomy plan, under which there seem to be three broad possible outcomes (assuming the plan is to go ahead):

i. Polisario, with the support of the exiled Sahrawi community, voluntarily gives up the Free Zone so that it can become part of an autonomous Saharan region within a greater Morocco. The refugees return home and everyone lives happily ever after. A problem with this scenario is that, even if Morocco granted the refugees the right of return, it’s far from certain that they would want to take it (1). Furthermore, does Morocco really want all those potentially troublesome Sahrawi nationalists flooding back into an autonomous Saharan province, where they may well form a majority of the population? I hear that for all the infrastructure development that is going on in the occupied territories, no plans have been laid to build homes for returning refugees. I don’t think the Moroccans are expecting them back any time soon.

ii. The autonomy plan is implemented, but only in the regions currently occupied by Morocco. The Free Zone is left as a rump Sahrawi state under the control of the Polisario or whatever form of government may evolve among the exiled Sahrawi community. Refugees settle in the Free Zone to the extent that resources (principally water) permit. Whether the Free Zone could support some 160,000 people is debatable. If the Free Zone was settled, Morocco would have to live with a Sahrawi state full of disgruntled inhabitants who would still hanker after their old homeland across the border. This, presumably, is not on the Moroccan agenda. Under this scenario the autonomy plan would merely crystalise the current situation, and might increase tension in the region over the long term.

iii. Morocco extends its control throughout the entire territory of Western Sahara by invading the Free Zone. This would result in conflict with the Polisario, possible conflict with Algeria, and could destabilise the Maghreb as a whole.

Of course there is a fourth option – that the implementation of the autonomy plan depends of the agreement of all the parties to the conflict, that this is not forthcoming, and, er, nothing happens. At the moment this seems to be the most likely outcome, at least in the short term. So what exactly is the purpose of the plan?

The autonomy plan is predicated on two fictions. First, that Western Sahara is simply a part of Morocco with a troublesome secessionist movement, when in reality it is a partially occupied territory that has been partitioned between Morocco and the Polisario. Second, that the refugees in the camps around Tindouf would be happy, and welcome, to return to their homeland as Moroccan subjects. While the proponents of the plan are presumably aware of these problems, they are never addressed, suggesting that the plan does not represent a serious attempt to resolve the conflict. It is the view of this blogger that the autonomy plan is a stalling tactic designed to defuse criticism of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara, and to discredit the Polisario (2). It seems to be the latest ruse via which Morocco seeks to avoid the holding of a referendum, while appearing to act constructively on the issue. It may seem like a solution to those not familiar with the realities of partition, which is why Morocco tries so hard to play down the existence of the Free Zone, and consistently underestimates the number, and misrepresents the aspirations, of the Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps. I look forward to finding out if these issues are addressed in Professor El Ouali’s book, but I won’t be holding my breath as I turn the pages.

———–

Notes

(1) I’ve often heard from Moroccan sources that the refugees are held in the camps against their will by the Polisario, that they are effectively Moroccan citizens (well, subjects) being held as hostages by a secessionist group, and that they would welcome the opportunity to return to the Moroccan homeland. The truth is somewhat different. The exiles are in the camps as the result of the Moroccan invasion and occupation of Western Sahara (they weren’t kidnapped from their homes by marauding Polisario snatch teams). They are more-or-less free to leave subject to having the right paperwork (as citizens of any country who are lucky enough to have a passport are free to leave their national territories). Sahrawi from the camps travel widely, and they are a pretty cosmopolitan bunch as a result. Many have studied abroad, and international exchanges with solidarity groups in a variety of countries are common. When rains in the Free Zone are good, some of the inhabitants of the camps take their camels there for pasture. So, whatever their flaws and democratic deficits, the camps are not prisons with Polisario troops acting as gaolers. The exiled Sahrawi that I’ve spoken to certainly want to return to Western Sahara, but they do not want to live under Moroccan sovereignty. In their decades in the camps, the exiled Sahrawi have developed a strong sense of national identity. It seems to me that they are more inclined to return to Western Sahara with Kalashnikovs, to attempt to liberate it, than they are to return to live as Moroccan subjects.

(2) As long as the Polisario refused to entertain the possibility of the full integration of Western Sahara into Morocco, Morocco accepted the idea of a referendum with options of full integration, limited autonomy within a greater Morocco, and full independence. However, the Polisario eventually agreed to a referendum including these three options. Having had its bluff called, Morocco rapidly went off the idea – presumably Rabat suffered from a sudden loss of confidence that the Sahrawi (and perhaps even Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara) would vote to be part of the Moroccan motherland.