Text of Military Agreement #1

In my last post I urged people to contact MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping to ask why vital information on the terms of the ceasefire in Western Sahara has been removed from the MINURSO website, and request that this information be reinstated. Here is the text in question, from Military Agreement (MA) #1, copied from the MINURSO website in October 2008 (from this address, which is now defunct: http://www.minurso.unlb.org/monitoring.html):

“MA#1 divides the disputed territory of Western Sahara into five parts:
• One 5 km wide Buffer Strip (BS) to the South and East side of the Berm;
• Two 30 km wide Restricted Areas (RA) along the Berm. The Buffer Strip is included in the
Restricted Area on the POLISARIO side and the Berm is included in the Restricted Area on
the RMA side;
• Two Areas with Limited Restrictions (ALR), which are the two remaining vast, stretches of
land of Western Sahara on both sides respectively.”

I quoted this text in a Briefing Note I prepared on the partition of Western Sahara, also in October 2008.

For a graphical representation of MA#1 click here. For Map A4-010 showing the ceasefire on the ground, see below, or click here for a jpeg version.

I’ve posted all this before, and will keep reposting it until MINURSO reinstates the relevant ceasefire information on its website, and Morocco’s propagandists stop their attempts to mislead the world into believing that Morocco controls all of Western Sahara, and that the Polisario-controlled areas are in fact an empty “buffer strip” set up by the UN for Morocco’s protection (the buffer zone is just 5km wide on one side of the Berm, and there is parity between the Moroccan and Polisario controlled zones, on either side of the Berm, in MA#1). Morocco is misrepresenting the situation on the ground in order to persuade the world that its “Autonomy Plan” for Western Sahara is viable. It is not, as it does not address the issue of partition, or of the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. The information presented here, downloaded from earlier versions of the MINURSO website, clearly contradicts Morocco’s representation of the situation. Rabat is desperate to obscure the situation on the ground, and it seems likely that this is why MINURSO removed the information relating to the terms of the ceasefire, as a result of pressure from Morocco and its allies France and the United States, which are pushing for a normalisation of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara. If this is not the case, all parties should be happy to see this information reinstated – that would be sufficient rebuttal.

Division of Western Sahara under the terms of the 1991 ceasefire agreement. Map from MINURSO.

Show me the text of MIlitary Agreement #1

Put pressure on UN Peackeeping and MINURSO, the UN peacekeeping force in Western Sahara, to reinstate the text of Military Agreeement #1 and Map No: A4-010 on the MINURSO website. This text and map clearly contradict Moroccan claims that it controls all of Western Sahara and that the Polisario independence movement has no presence there (see this earlier post for a discussion, this schematic representation of the ceasefire terms, and below or here for a relevant map). The absence of this information – removed by MINURSO sometime over the past year or so – plays into the hands of Morocco’s propagandists. MINURSO has not responded to repeated requests for clarification on this matter. Maybe they will take it more seriously if more people contact them.

Please write to UN Peacekeeping operations and MINURSO asking why MA #1 and Map No A4-010 have been removed from the MINURSO website, and requesting that they be reinstated.

You can contact UN Peacekeeping operations at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/contact.asp, and you can email MINURSO at minursoinformationofficer@un.org [update: some email has bounced back from this address, so make sure you also contact peacekeeping via the web form in the above link]. Suggested text is below, or write you own.

Suggested text

Dear Sir or Madam

I am trying to find official copies of Military Agreement (MA) #1 and Map No: A4-010, relating to the 1991 ceasefire agreement between the Moroccan Armed Forces and the Frente Polisario in Western Sahara. These were available via the MINURSO local website prior to 2010. However, since the website has been redesigned these materials have not been available on the MINURSO site, and do not appear to be available on any other UN websites.

Could you please point me to a publicly available official UN source of this text.

I would also be very grateful for any information as to why this text has been removed from the MINURSO website, and request that these documents be reinstated.

Yours faithfully

—-
Background

In 1975 Morocco invaded Western Sahara. In 1991 the UN brokered a ceasefire between the Moroccan Armed Forces and the Polisario independence movement. The United Nations MIssion for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established to organise a referendum on self determination for this disputed, non-self governing territory, and to monitory the ceasefire.The terms of the ceasefire were set out in Military Agreement (MA) #1 and Map No A4-010 (see image here), which describe the zones defined under the ceasefire, as follows:One 5 kilometres (3 mi) wide Buffer Strip (BS) to the South and East side of the Berm [the 1500 km wall built by Morocco to secure the areas it has occupied in the north and west of Western Sahara];Two 30 kilometres (19 mi) wide Restricted Areas (RA) along the Berm. The Buffer Strip is included in the Restricted Area on the POLISARIO side and the Berm is included in the Restricted Area on the RMA side;

Two Areas with Limited Restrictions (ALR), which are the two remaining vast, stretches of land of Western Sahara on both sides respectively.

The text of MA #1 is embarrassing to Morocco, which repeatedly claims to control all of Western Sahara. The reality of partition means that Morocco’s plan for limited autonomy for the territory is unworkable. The Autonomy Plan ignores the fact that this “solution” can only apply to the areas of Western Sahara under Moroccan control, and not to the entire territory. It also ignores the plight of some 165,000 Sahrawi refugees displaced by the conflict. Moroccan propagandists claim that the areas to the south and east of the Berm are a “buffer strip” set up by the UN, from which the Polisario is barred. In fact, these are made up of the Restricted Area and the Area of Limited Restrictions, which are equivalent to the areas on the Moroccan controlled side of the Berm.

Sometime in 2010 the text of MA #1 and Map No A4-010 were removed from the MINURSO website, an action that is beneficial to Morocco and prejudicial to the peace process. A peacekeeping force mandated to monitor a ceasefire should be transparent with respect to its mandate and objectives. MINURSO is not, and the removal of this vital information could be interpreted as an action designed to favour Morocco in its propaganda campaign. MINURSO have ignored repeated enquiries regarding this matter.

A return to war in Western Sahara

Nick Brooks

You may or may not have heard that the ceasefire that has held for nearly 30 years in Western Sahara broke down yesterday, and the territory is now at war again. There is nothing on the BBC news website about it at the time of writing, although it did get a brief mention on the World Service and there is this article from the New York Times.

Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario – have their versions of what’s happened, and Morocco is likely to have the loudest voice. So here’s my take.

Morocco invaded Western Sahara in 1975, when Spain pulled out. The Polisario, formed a few years earlier to fight for independence from Spain, opposed Morocco’s occupation. A war was fought until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire and installed a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO. As the name indicates, this force was mandated to organise a referendum on self-determination. This has never happened, and MINURSO remains the only peacekeeping force without a human rights monitoring mandate. Western Sahara remains a non self-governing territory as defined by the UN Committee on Decolonisation. In other words, the decolonisation process has not yet been competed. Western Sahara is often referred to as the Last Colony in Africa.

Throughout the 1975-1991 conflict, Morocco secured territory it had taken behind defensive earthworks or berms. By 1991, these had merged into a single structure – The Berm – which stretches 2700km (about 1700 miles) across the territory, effectively partitioning it into a Moroccan controlled zone to the west and north, and a Polisario controlled zone to the east and south (Figure 1). A detailed analysis of the Berm and its evolution is provided by Garfi (2014).

Figure 1. Western Sahara under the ceasefire, showing partition by the Moroccan Berm, key locations, and deployment of MINURSO peacekeepers. Map from MINURSO/UN Peacekeeping.

Under the terms of the ceasefire, Western Sahara is divided into three areas (Figure 1):

i) a Buffer Strip extending for 5km east and south of the Berm on the Polisario side, which is effectively an exclusion zone or no-man’s land, in which no military personnel or equipment are permitted;

ii) two Restricted Areas, extending for 30km either side of the Berm, in which military activities are prohibited; and

iii) two Areas with Limited Restrictions, which include all the remaining territory of Western Sahara, in which normal military activities can be carried out with the exception of those that represent an escalation of the military situation.

Figure 2. Schematic showing the different areas defined under the ceasefire.

The above information, including maps showing the different zones and the text of the ceasefire (Military Agreement #1) used to be on the MINURSO website but were removed some years ago. When asked, MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping would not explain why, leading many to conclude this was a result of Moroccan lobbying. Morocco’s narrative is that it controls all of Western Sahara except a buffer strip established by the UN for its protection, and that the Polisario has no presence in Western Sahara. The maps and military agreement clearly contradict this.

Since 1991, Morocco has been entrenching its occupation of Western Sahara and developing its natural resources, against international conventions that prohibit occupying powers from exploiting resources in occupied territories for their own gain. These resources include phosphates, fisheries and water resources – Morocco has developed agriculture in occupied Western Sahara, including the production of water-intensive crops such as tomatoes (including the Azera brand).

Some of these resources and the products derived from them transit through Mauritania to the south, for example, fish products from occupied Western Saharan waters that are destined for African markets via the port of Nouadhibouin Mauritania. This route involves traffic passing through the Berm south of the settlement of Guergerat (Figure 3), then traversing the buffer strip for 5km to the border with Mauritania (Figure 4).

Figure 3. Guergerat location in the far southwest of Western Sahara.

In late October 2020, Sahrawi protestors started blockading the road between the Guergerat Berm crossing and the Mauritanian border (Figure 4), within the Buffer Strip. They were protesting against the export of natural resources, including fish destined for the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou, from occupied Western Sahara by Morocco. They also accused Morocco of facilitating the trafficking of drugs and people via Guergerat.

Figure 4. The road that passes through the Berm (top) south of Guergerat, traversing the 5km Buffer Strip established under the 1991 ceasefire, to the Western Sahara-Mauritania border. See Figure

On 12th/13th November, Morocco sent troops to disperse the protestors and take control of the section of road traversing the Buffer Strip. By merely entering the Buffer Strip, Morocco breached the ceasefire. On 13th November, the Polisario declared that this breach marked the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities, and that they were now at war with Morocco. Later on the 13th, Morocco reported clashes along the Berm in the north of Western Sahara, and on the 14th it appeared that fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Mahbes and Hauza in the north of Western Sahara, and Aouserd and Guergerat in the south.

This all comes against a background of 45 years of conflict and exile for the Sahrawi. Somewhere around 100,000 Sahrawi live under Moroccan occupation, while perhaps around 200,000 live in five refugee camps in the Algerian desert around the town of Tindouf. These camps are governed by the Polisario, and are effectively a society and state in exile. The Polisario also controls the areas to the east and south of the Berm, known to the Sahrawi as the Free Zone.

For decades, discontent in the camps has been growing, particularly among younger Sahrawis, in response to the stalemate, the failure of the UN to organise the long-promised referendum, and an understandable perception that they have been forgotten and abandoned by the rest of world. Many see a return to war as the only way of having any hope of resolving the conflict, whether through military means or as the result of diplomacy facilitated by what they hope will be a renewed spotlight on the territory if hostilities resume. For many years, the Polisario has managed to keep this discontent contained and has avoided conflict. It seems that the latest provocation by Morocco has been too flagrant for this approach to remain viable.

Nick Brooks has travelled extensively in Western Sahara, as co-director of the Western Sahara Project, a research project focusing on archaeology and past environmental change in the territory. Between 2002 and 2009 he led six seasons of fieldwork in the Polisario-controlled zone of Western Sahara, and travelled to the territory on seven occasions, also spending time in the Sahrawi refugee camps around Tindouf. Fieldwork involved frequent detours into Mauritania to avoid the Moroccan Berm.

@SAHARAWIVOICE on Twitter is a good source of updates on the conflict.

Areas defined under the UN ceasefire in Western Sahara

Following on from my last 2 posts, here are a couple of images that schematically illustrate the division of Western Sahara into different areas under the UN ceasefire agreement of 1991, as enshrined in Military Agreement #1. I think I downloaded them from the MINURSO website some time ago, although did not note the precise origin – presumably as I had no reason to believe that MINURSO would decide to remove this vital and basic information.

Co-opting the peacekeepers?

Is the United Nations suppressing information to support an illegal occupation?

In September 1991, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario, the two claimants to the disputed Non-Self Governing Territory of Western Sahara. Morocco and the Polisario had been fighting a war for control over the territory since 1975, when Morocco sent troops and civilians into Western Sahara during its “Green March”, the aim of which was to establish the former Spanish colony as part of a greater Morocco.

As part of the ceasefire, the UN established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (known by its French acronym, MINURSO), a peacekeeping force mandated with monitoring the ceasefire and overseeing a referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara. Some 20 years on, the referendum has still not been held, and there seems little prospect that the ongoing political conflict between Morocco and the Polisario over the status of Western Sahara will be resolved in the foreseeable future.

Currently, Western Sahara is effectively partitioned, with Morocco controlling the bulk (some three quarters) of Western Sahara, and the Polisario controlling the remainder. The Moroccan and Polisario controlled areas are separated by a series of earthworks (variously referred to as the “wall”, “sand wall” or “berm”), constructed by Morocco to secure the territory it has gained through military means during the course of its occupation of Western Sahara.

Under the terms of the ceasefire, a number of zones or areas were defined, and permitted activities inside each area were specified. And this is the crux of this particular blog post.

The various areas defined under the ceasefire, and the activities permitted in each area, were detailed in Military Agreement No. 1 (MA#1) and on Map No: A4-010 (deployment of MINURSO). The text of MA#1, and Map No: A4-010, used to be available via MINURSO’s mission website and local website, located easily by clicking on the links on the latter site’s side bar.

And so back to that crux.

You may have noted the use of the past tense in the above text – these key ceasefire documents “used to be available” via the MINURSO websites. Since at least as early as December 2010, MA#1 and Map No: A4-010 have disappeared from the MINURSO local website (and are not available via the mission website). Given that MINURSO’s principal task (the long-delayed referendum notwithstanding) is to monitor the ceasefire, it seems somewhat bizarre that their website does not include the information on the different ceasefire zones and the permitted activity in each of these zones. This is obviously not simply due to sloppy website maintenance – the MINURSO website has been given a pretty comprehensive overhaul in the past year or so, and now contains lots of information and links to relevant documentation, mostly UN resolutions and letters from the UN Secretary General and the Security Council.

Back in 2010 I contacted MINURSO by email (minursoinformationofficer@un.org) to ask why the detailed information on the ceasefire arrangements had been removed, and where it could be found. This was followed by emails to other public information personnel at the UN who were concerned with Western Sahara. However, I never received a reply to these emails. When I followed this up informally with a UN source, their response was this. “Somehow I doubt, in present circumstances, that you will get a reply from the mission, or at least a reply that will be of any use.” When I asked my source whether they were able to elaborate on why a reply was unlikely “in the present circumstances”, and what these circumstances were, they replied “Not really”. This correspondence took place in early December 2010.

So, why the removal of important information relating to the nature of the ceasefire, and why the lack of response to an inquiry about its removal? And why the secrecy? I’m certainly prepared to speculate – here goes.

There currently seems to be no resolution in sight to the Western Sahara conflict. This has frustrated key players within the UN and internationally. As detailed in Stephen Zunes’ and Jacob Mundy’s recent, and excellent, book, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution, key members of the UN security council (France and the United States) have long been enthusiastic (to say the least) in their support of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara. In the amoral world of realpolitik, these countries in particular view the integration of Western Sahara into a greater Morocco as a practical solution to the conflict. Accordingly, they support Morocco’s “Autonomy Plan”, which would make Western Sahara part of Morocco and give it some token limited autonomy under a partially devolved administration rubber stamped or appointed by the Moroccan monarchy. I’ve written elsewhere about why this “solution” is dubious at best (also here).

So what has this got to do with the information on MINURSO’s website? Well, first we need to recognise that the UN and its various agencies are not independent bodies, but are expressions of the will of the UN’s member states. Particular UN agencies will be of particular interest to certain countries (e.g. those that provide their funding), and these countries will have an influence over their behaviour. Powerful voices within the UN lobby for their own interests and those of their friends, making the UN a forum in which key players compete with each other for dominance and advantage according to their own agendas. In short, UN agencies are subject to influence from powerful interests, and there is no reason to believe that MINURSO is any different.

Second, the ready availability of information on the terms of the ceasefire is an embarrassment to Morocco and, by extension, to those countries who support Morocco in its continuing (and illegal) occupation of Western Sahara. Morocco likes to give the impression that it controls all of Western Sahara, and that all that needs to be done to resolve the conflict is for the international community to accept Morocco’s claim to the territory. The Moroccan line is that Morocco has already achieved de facto integration of Western Sahara, making its control over the territory a done deal – if only the international community would accept this “fact on the ground” the problem would go away.

The Moroccan line is disingenuous, and its Autonomy Plan does nothing to address the partition of Western Sahara or the issue of the Sahrawi refugees displaced by the conflict and living in camps near the Algerian town of Tindouf. The airing of these issues makes the Autonomy Plan look rather flaky and inadequate, and exposes the Plan as a PR exercise to legitimise the occupation rather than a serious, sincere and workable way of resolving the conflict. Under the Autonomy Plan the territory would remain partitioned (or be subject to further fighting as Morocco sought to control all of Western Sahara), and the refugees would remain in exile (Morocco constantly underplays the number of refugees and is unlikely to welcome them as new subjects). The Plan would also fail to uphold the right of self determination enshrined in so many UN resolutions relating to Western Sahara.

Consequently, it is in Morocco’s interests to manipulate information relating to the conflict in order to marginalise the refugee issue and cloud the issue of partition. Morocco’s propagandists have a habit of telling people that the Polisario does not control any territory in Western Sahara, and that what the Polisario and the exiled Sahrawi refer to as the (Polisario controlled) “Free Zone” is in fact a “buffer zone” set up with the tacit approval of the UN to keep the Polisario out of “Moroccan” territory. This is nonsense. There is a “Buffer Strip” under the ceasefire, but this extends only 5 km east and south of the Berm or sand wall into the Polisario controlled areas. On either side of the Berm, a “Restricted Area” extends for 30 km. On both sides of the Berm, the remaining areas are defined as “Areas with Limited Restrictions”. With the exception of the Buffer Strip, which is present only on the Polisario side of the Berm, there is parity in terms of what the Moroccan armed forces and the Polisario are permitted to do on their respective sides of the Berm.

The above is all set out in MA#1, a reading of which reveals that Morocco’s claims (i) to control all of Western Sahara, (ii) that the Polisario has no active or legitimate presence in the territory, and (iii) that the areas in which Polisario might operate are in fact a buffer zone set up for Morocco’s benefit, are all nonsense. Unfortunately, now that MINURSO has removed MA#1 and Map No:A4-010, it is much less straightforward to challenge Rabat’s nonsense using authoritative sources. Well, I say unfortunately, but this is, of course, rather fortunate for Morocco and its friends.

And this is what is really suspicious. The most likely explanation for the removal of this basic, vital and (to the Moroccan camp) embarrassing information seems to be that Morocco and its friends have leaned on MINURSO to remove this information, in order to eliminate a counter to a key pillar of Morocco’s propaganda campaign. If there is a more innocent explanation, why has MINURSO been so reluctant to provide it. Unless they can allay fears that they have been co-opted by Morocco’s propaganda machine, perhaps we should be renaming them the MINUPOSO – United Nations Mission for the Perpetuation of the Occupation in Western Sahara.

TARA out of her depth

Another story of collusion with the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, by people who should know better.

A year ago I posted an article about the restoration of some rock art sites in the Free Zone of Western Sahara, that had been vandalised by UN peacekeepers, whose inability to live up to their mandate, and indeed their name, is going from strength to strength.

In the same article I mentioned a meeting in the town of Smaara on the preservation of rock art sites, organised by the Trust for African Rock Art (TARA) in collaboration with the occupying Moroccan authorities [see here to locate Smaara on a map showing the division of Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario independence movement under the terms of the UN ceasefire signed in 1991]. At the time of the post I had very little information on the Smaara meeting, other than that it was reported in the Algerian daily Ennahar and smelt a bit fishy.

The TARA meeting in occupied Smaara, from 19-21 October 2010, was followed by the so-called “Smara Declaration” on the protection of rock art. Despite the publicity about this declaration at the time, the Declaration seems to have disappeared from the web, and specifically from TARA’s website, which describes the outcome of the meeting as a “19-point Declaration that encourages governments and rock art professionals to take proactive conservation measures.” The ostensible links to the Declaration itself (in English and French) now point to a page of “rock art news” and related information. Hovering over the links reveals a ghostly web address to “Morocco_declaration_final.pdf” and “Declaration_du_Maroc_final.pdf”. Calling a declaration made in Smara, an important town in occupied Western Sahara, the “Morocco Declaration”, even in a URL, is a bit like calling something agreed in Glasgow the “England Declaration” (in terms of political ignorance and general daftness), or an agreement made in the West Bank the “Israel Declaration” (in terms of crass insensitivity).

So, what on Earth was TARA doing holding a meeting on the preservation of cultural heritage in a town in an illegally occupied territory, in collaboration with the occupying power? This is insensitive to say the least. In the view of one of my colleagues, an academic who has spent decades carrying out research work in various parts of the Sahara:

“The Moroccan monarchy and government are responsible for the worst case of theft of cultural heritage (and all other resources) after now 35 years of illegal occupation of the Western Sahara. The Moroccan rulers and military are also responsible for vandalism in the largest sense through the bombardments and destructions during the 16-year long war against the Sahrawi resistance, and by the construction of the 2,700 km long wall with its countless landmines. Indirectly, the Moroccan occupants can also be held responsible for the destruction of prehistoric rock art since the armistice in 1991 by members of the United Nations MINURSO that we observed during a mission in the Free Zone in 2007 (http://www.revistaelobservador.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1259&Itemid=1).

Cooperating with a Moroccan ministry to launch declarations against theft and vandalism is therefore sheer mockery. Selecting a venue in an occupied zone is unacceptable…”

In the months that followed the Smaara meeting I had some correspondence with members of the board of TARA, initiated by an email copied to various interested parties including TARA, in which I summed up the situation thus:

“Anyone attending the Smara meeting has, by definition, collaborated with an occupying power in a disputed, non-self governing territory, and has acted to further the cause of colonialism in Africa, against the spirit of the numerous UN resolutions on decolonisation in Western Sahara (and the values that most of us would no doubt claim to hold). This displays an astonishing level of naivety on the part of the international delegates at this conference, who have been used as political pawns in an ongoing process in which Morocco attempts to legitimise its occupation of Western Sahara and mislead the international community about the situation in the territory.

I applaud the wide work of organisations such as TARA. However, more political acumen needs to be displayed in future, particularly when addressing issues in Western Sahara and other disputed territories. Perhaps TARA could redress the balance by organising a similar meeting on the other side of the Moroccan wall that partitions Western Sahara, where the Polisario have taken significant and effective steps to preserve the archaeological sites in the areas that they control.”

While my suggestions about redressing the balance were not taken up, I did receive this response from David Coulson, who founded TARA in 1996:

“Thank you for your welcome and important feedback with suggestions.  The above workshop was planned and considered from the start as a low profile professional and non-political event to be one of about 3 rock art workshops in different parts of the country (next two may be Zagora and Rabat) over the next 3 or 4 years.  The organisers’choice of Smara was mainly dictated by nearby Tazina rock art sites as well as previously well publicized  incidents of damage (caused by UN peace keepers) in the region.  No endorsement of the current political situation in the territory was implied or intended.  Our sole motivation and ambition was to address the serious conservation issues in this part of Africa. TARA regrets any misunderstandings in this regard.”

In the interests of verisimilitude, and more importantly to save me some typing, I’ll simply reproduce my reply to David Coulson here.

“I’m sure TARA did not intend the meeting to reflect or support any particular political position, and that the meeting was intended to be completely apolitical. Unfortunately, nothing to do with Western Sahara remains apolitical for long.  Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario front – will turn the activities of foreigners in Western Sahara to their perceived advantage where they can. Anyone undertaking academic work in the territory needs to acknowledge this and decide whether it is a price that is worth paying.

I have been working in Western Sahara since 2002, in the areas controlled by the Polisario. This requires cooperation with the Polisario on a logistical basis, as I am sure the organisation of conferences in parts of Western Sahara occupied by Morocco requires cooperation from the Moroccan authorities or their proxies. Our team believes that cooperation with the Polisario is ethically sound, given that they are recognised as the legitimate government of Western Sahara  by the Africa Union and most individual African governments, and have a decent claim to be the representatives of the indigenous Sahrawi people. We are working with, and for the benefit of, the indigenous people, rather than the occupying power.

Morocco’s position in Western Sahara, while tacitly supported by some Western governments, is at odds with the numerous UN resolutions regarding Western Sahara and the process of decolonisation, and also with the ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding the status of the territory. Morocco will certain use anything it can to further strengthen and legitimise its position in Western Sahara, in its ongoing and vigorous propaganda campaign. This politicking is also played out in the area of cultural heritage, as previous actions by Morocco have demonstrated. Holding a conference in occupied Western Sahara in collaboration with the Moroccan authorities serves the Moroccan agenda, and is a political act whether you like it or not. This is illustrated by the following statement from Moroccan journal Le Soir, which seeks firmly to establish Moroccan ownership of the issue:

“Le Maroc est le leader dans les pays africains en ce qui concerne l’art rupestre, c’est tout à fait normal d’organiser une réunion d’une telle importance chez nous et plus spécialement dans la région du Sud qui regorge de gravures rupestres ”, souligne Abdellah Salah, le directeur du patrimoine au ministère de la Culture.

Perhaps cooperating with Morocco, and thus helping lend the appearance of legitimacy to its occupation of Western Sahara, is a price worth paying if it results in the protection and preservation of rock art. This is a subjective judgment that must be made by individuals based on their personal priorities and beliefs. However, I’m afraid claims that such activities are apolitical are simply misguided, whatever the original intention. You and your colleagues may be apolitical in your views, but actions have political ramifications, rarely more so than in the context of the Western Sahara conflict.

I am not suggesting a boycott of Morocco, or even that you and your colleagues refrain from venturing into occupied Western Sahara. However, it would be prudent in the circumstances to ensure that any meetings likely to receive international publicity were held in Morocco proper, not in the Moroccan-occupied areas of the disputed, non-self governing territory of Western Sahara.

In the event that TARA decides to investigate rock art and related issues of heritage in the Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara, where significant assemblages of rock art have suffered vandalism and are still at risk despite restoration efforts, I’d be happy to offer assistance. There is real will to protect the rock art there, but resources and capacity are severely limited, given that we are dealing with what is essentially a refugee population. Of course the political issues remain, albeit in a different form – the Moroccan authorities would surely be furious to see TARA operating on the other side of the Berm and undermining its ‘legitimacy” on the issue of Sahara cultural heritage. But there is a real opportunity for engagement there, in a way that would help foster a truly positive attitude to rock art among the Sahrawi population who are the de facto custodians of the rock art, and help to ensure that the cultural heritage of Western Sahara is preserved for future generations.”

Note: links added.

I should have added that if TARA wanted to speak to the issue of well publicised damage to rock art sites by UN peacekeepers as claimed, they could have held the meeting in the Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara, where this vandalism took place.

David Coulson kindly acknowledged this email, and expressed appreciation for the offer of assistance, and a will to be more cautious about such matters in the future, and to seek appropriate advice.

That was all back in November 2010. (Yes, I know, I’m not particularly timely with my posts – blame over commitment and the need to juggle research, blogging and earning a living.) So, how did TARA ultimately respond to the criticism from myself and a number of other members of the academic community? Did they organise a goodwill event on the other side of the Berm, in the parts of Western Sahara controlled by the Polisario, the other party to the conflict? Did they put out a statement fessing up to, or even apologising for, their tacit endorsement of an illegal military occupation?

Well, there is one sentence on the TARA website that addresses this spectacular failure of political acumen, that reads

“Holding the workshop in Smara should not be interpreted as a political statement by TARA or WAC [the World Archaeological Congress].”

I’m afraid that’s it, although perhaps the lack of the text of the Declaration is the result of a surreptitious removal of what might be viewed as embarrassing evidence.

Of course, the TARA-Smaara debacle was followed swiftly by the repression of the Gdaim Izik protest camp by Moroccan security forces, the circumstances and repercussions of which are still quite murky. Needless to say, this overshadowed matters related to rock art and the political acumen of organisations dealing in cultural heritage.

Nonetheless, after my correspondence with David Coulson, I had further correspondence with people who had attended, or been invited to, the Smaara meeting. One invitee who did not attend the meeting had this to say:

“As someone who did not travel to Smara, I feel ashamed that we as a group of truely bona fide scientists (I think of us, who are doing rock art research, as some kind of collective body) did not notice early enough that a meeting in Smara has strong poltical implications. The demand on Morocco to allow the Sahrawi people to decide their own future is not by some obscure political organisation but by the UN and the AU (African Union – of which Morocco is the only African state that is not a member).

The theft of rock art touches our competence, so our voices should be raised. But to be trustworthy this cannot be done in an environment that is characterised by theft of land and opression of people. Ethics is an important element of our work with rock art and if this issue is anything, it is an ethical question. Therefore we should try and correct somehow this unfortunate decision of meeting in Smara, e.g. by placing a respective statement on the TARA homepage.

I hope that despite all uneasiness many of you can support this too.”

Of course this suggestion wasn’t taken up. One of the TARA board members, George Abungu, put it this way: “I feel this matter should be left to rest”. I guess this reflected the view of the board at large.

The last piece of written correspondence on the matter, on 9 December 2010, was from someone who had attended the meeting, who had this to say:

“I agree that we should make some statement on this.  I think few, if any, of us who attended the meeting, had a real understanding of the issues.  I have to admit that I was barely aware of where I was travelling to, much less that this was an occupied area, until I arrived in Morocco.  I must also say that conference some valuable outcomes, some of which drew upon  input from Sahrawi people.  I do not regret going there and meeting these people, and getting to understand their situation.

Of course, we were not aware that the Moroccan government would use our presence to endorse the illegitimate occupation of the area.  We are archaeologists – and we know that cultural heritage is used for political purposes – so we did become aware of this during the meeting.  I can’t speak for TARA, but I imagine that their experience is similar.

I’d be happy to work with people on developing a statement, around making it clear that our presence in Smara did not endorse the current occupation of the Sahara by the  Moroccan government.”

Apparently nothing happened after this, and the issue was indeed “left to rest”. This is a real pity. Through naivety and an unwillingness to address its colossal political error, TARA has given another little bit of support to the Moroccan occupation, and helped to further the cause of colonialism in Africa. For an organisation focusing on Africa and African rock art, an awful lot of which is in the Sahara, this level of naivety (and let us hope it is just naivety) is astonishing, and more than a little bit depressing.

Leaked Cables: Morocco and Western Sahara

Over at the Huffington Post Stephen Zunes writes about how the WikiLeaks cables illuminate the role of ideology in Washington’s approach to Western Sahara, with a pretty damning verdict on the ex US ambassador to Morocco (now in Cameroon), Robert P Jackson. However, beyond Zunes’ analysis and a few blog posts here and there, what the leaked cables have to say about Western Sahara has, unsurprisingly, received little attention. So, here is an attempt to plug the gap. I’ll try and expand/augment this post in due course, when time permits.

The discussion below is based on two cables circulated by Spanish daily El Pais, and three cables posted by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar (whose website is down as I write this). The latter are from a batch of nearly 200 cables obtained by Al -Akhbar from a source other than WikiLeaks, according to The Atlantic, which concludes that the cables are most likely genuine. Of course we have to entertain the possibility that they are not, although this seems remote. The cables discussed here date back to 2006 – those prior to 2009 (all but one) were sent when the last Bush administration was in power. I’ve included links to the cables available on the El Pais website. However, as the Al-Akhbar site is currently down, and the other cables do not appear to be available elsewhere, no links can be provided for these at the present time (I’m working from versions printed before the site went down). Some cables released by Al-Akhbar are available elsewhere, such as these from the Algerian embassy.

The cables cover a number of themes, around which the discussion below is organized. Cables are identified by a code indicating the year (first two characters), the place of origin (in this case Rabat and Casablanca), and the number of the cable.

Autonomy/MINURSO: pressure and protection

Cable 06RABAT678 describes a meeting with Taieb Fassi Fihri, Minister-Delegate of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara was discussed. The tone of the cable is very much one that emphasises what it calls the “difficulty” of Morocco’s position, and Fassi Fihri acknowledged that the Polisario and Algeria are “probably not willing to discuss” the autonomy plan. One thing that is particularly notable in this cable is the statement that “Fassi Fihri wanted to be assured that the US would continue to support MINURSO even if a credible autonomy plan is not submitted in a timely manner.” The US ambassador is reported to have responded that “engagement between Morocco and other actors is necessary and that a substantive autonomy plan and implementation plan must be submitted or there will be no support for a MINURSO extension.”

Two conclusions may be drawn from the above. First, Morocco sees the MINURSO presence in Western Sahara as in its interests. This will come as no surprise to those who conclude that one of the main roles that MINURSO has played has been to freeze the conflict while Morocco entrenches its position in Western Sahara. Morocco’s desire to keep MINURSO in Western Sahara is deeply ironic, given Morocco’s insistence that the referendum that MINURSO is mandated to arrange will never take place. For those unfamiliar with the situation in Western Sahara it’s worth pointing out that MINURSO stands for United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Second, the US put pressure on Morocco to move forward with the autonomy plan, egging Morocco on in the legitimization of its occupation of Western Sahara.

Corruption: occupation as opportunity

Cable 08RABAT727 addresses corruption in the Moroccan military, which is described as widespread (the term “plagued” is used liberally). The cable claims that “Lt Gen. Bennani [commander of the forces in Western Sahara] is using his post to skim money from military contracts and to influence business decisions”, and that it is rumoured that he owns a large part of the fisheries in Western Sahara. This situation is seen as symptomatic of the legacy of Hassan II’s deal with the military, which is characterised as “remain loyal, and you can profit” (historically, fear of a coup against appears to be one of the main determinants of the palace’s relationship with the military). In this context, the Western Sahara command is apparently seen as particularly lucrative and jealously guarded by a few families within the military. Outside of the military, cable 09CASABLANCA226 concludes that corruption in the real estate sector is increasing rather than diminishing.

Security and Terror: spectres and diversions

The leaked cables highlight Morocco’s strategy of playing the security card in order to bolster its position in Western Sahara, but also illustrate that they are overplaying their hand here.

Cable 09RABAT479 describes how Mustapha Mansouri, President of the Chamber of Deputies, “feared that the loss of Western Sahara would open a vast, anarchic ungoverned space, with no real borders extending thousands if miles east from the Atlantic. Only Western Sahara, under Morocco’s control, was an exception.” Mansouri used some of the arguments beloved of the commenters on this blog, particularly our old friend Ahmed Salem Amr Khaddad, to characterise the conflict. He “said that the conflict was really a legacy of the Cold War and of Algeria’s continued attachment to Eastern, socialist models.” Mansouri reiterated the Moroccan position regarding the UN mandated referendum in Western Sahara, that “self-determination could mean autonomy or integration but not independence.” As usual, Morocco believes that self-determination for the people of Western Sahara means something determined by outsiders in Rabat. No further comment should really be necessary here.

[The above cable was sent in the context of visit by a number of US Senators, led by Senator Richard Burr, to Morocco. The cable concludes by saying that the Senators “learned more about Western Sahara”, and Burr “assured Mansouri that he would be welcomed on Capitol Hill.”]

Cable 8RABAT150 covers some similar themes, and describes a meeting with Mohamed Yassine Mansouri (no relation to the Mustapha Mansouri mentioned above), chief of Morocco’s external intelligence service. This Mansouri echoed his namesake, saying that “no Maghreb country, with the possible exception of Morocco, can begin to control its frontiers.” On the Polisario, Mansouri did his best to have it both ways, saying that “the terrorist threat there is real”, while being “very careful to say that the GOM [Government of Morocco] does not think the POLISARIO is a terrorist organization.” However, he did claim that

“…some members of the POLISARIO have joined AQIM [Al Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb]. Morocco is particularly concerned that should Algeria and the POLISARIO install themselves outside the berm in the no man’s land in Western Sahara, this could become a base for terrorist training and operations, which Morocco could not tolerate.”

We can only presume that Mansouri was engaging in the old Moroccan trick of deliberately confusing the 5 km buffer strip on the east and south of the berm (the only part of Western Sahara that might be described as a “no man’s land”) with the extensive area under Polisario control that, like the considerable large area controlled by Morocco, is designated as an “area with limited restrictions” under the terms of the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire agreement. This, again, is a favourite tactic by Morocco, which seems desperate to deny the reality that Western Sahara is actually partitioned, with the areas controlled by Morocco and the Polisario having parity of status under the terms of the ceasefire, and therefore in international law (see earlier posts here and here). To acknowledge this fact would be to admit that all its autonomy plan will do is legitimize a partial occupation of Western Sahara, without actually resolving the conflict. As for members of the Polisario joining AQIM, well, show us the evidence. To those of us who have interacted with the Polisario this seems unlikely, to say the least. The Polisario leadership would be very unlikely to tolerate any such conversion, given its fears of radicalization among the population of the refugee camps and its concerns about its international reputation and image.

Cable 08RABAT727 rather deflates Mansouri’s claims, exhibiting a clear understanding of the geopolitical realities in Western Sahara as it talks about Polisario’s “small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.” It goes on to say that

“the GOM [govt. of Morocco] almost certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no current threat that could not be effectively countered. The POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist bombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised, there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity among the indigenous Sahrawi population.”

Talking of radicalization, Morocco’s obsession with the “empty spaces” of the Sahara, and with the alleged terrorist threat posed by any settlement of the Western Sahara conflict not in its favour, is put in perspective by the very real and demonstrable radicalization of Moroccans inside Morocco. Cable 8RABAT150 describes how Minister of the Interior Chakib Benmoussa “pointed out that approximately 60 Moroccans had been arrested before they could depart Morocco” for Iraq, and that another 70 were “being watched and/or sought in the country and the region.” Morocco’s external intelligence service “noted that 139 Moroccan foreign fighters had attempted to go to Iraq since 2003,” with a “resurgence in the foreign fighter pipeline in 2006”. 40 Moroccans “had definitely reached Iraq, and 38 of them had participated in suicide missions.” The intelligence service also noted that “Moroccan cells cooperated with individuals and cells in Denmark, Sweden, Span, Saudi Arabia and Syria.” The Foreign Minister “lamented that potential extremists pay too much attention to al-Jazeera,” something that might not be a problem now, since Morocco kicked them out of the country for being too critical of the Moroccan government.

Cable 08RABAT727 briefly touches on the issue of home-grown militancy, stating that “reporting suggests small numbers of FAR soldiers remains [sic] susceptible to Islamic radicalization”, and reminding readers that those behind the 2003 Casablanca bombings included members of the Moroccan military. Following the 2003 bombings, “Morocco’s internal security services have identified and apprehended several military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells, some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for terrorism.”

A number of the cables highlight Morocco’s concerns (real or contrived) about Mauritania’s stability, and cable 8RABAT150 reports that Morocco’s external intelligence chief Mansouri argued that “Mauritania’s stability was more important than democracy”. To the Embassy staff’s credit, they responded that they believed it was possible to have both stability and democracy in Mauritania.

The main conclusion to be drawn here is that, while Morocco is keen to see terrorist threats in Western Sahara and among the Polisario and Sahrawi, the real terrorist threats to the Moroccan state are emanating from Morocco itself, and Morocco is playing a significant de facto role in the export of militant Islam.

Deployment: massively committed, thinly stretched, and poorly prepared

Cable 08RABAT727 claims that the Moroccan armed forces (Forces Armées Royales, or FAR) are preoccupied with Western Sahara, with some 50-70% of its strength deployed there at any given time. However, the FAR are reported to be stretched thin in Western Sahara, with operational readiness estimated at 40%.

Foreign friends

History demonstrates that unpleasant regimes bent on suppressing dissent and menacing their neighbours can always find foreign apologists who are ready to scurry to their defence without bothering to understand precisely what it is they are defending. It seems that Morocco is no exception in having an army of foreign sycophants ready to fight for its right to expand its territory through force and stamp on anyone who might object to its imperial designs. A growing chorus of appeasement can be heard from lobbyists, politicians and certain elements of the media by anyone who tunes into the news on Western Sahara.

The Francophone world has always been keen on Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara (with some noble exceptions), and this phenomenon shows no sign of abating. The latest bare-faced brown-nosing comes from the mayor for Woippy (no, I’d never heard of it either), François Grosdidier, who also happens to be vice-president of the French-Moroccan friendship group in the French parliament. In a article in Religious Intelligence (no jokes please) he is quoted regurgitating the Moroccan line. Here are a couple of choice quotes:

“Given Morocco’s legitimacy on the Sahara, this autonomy initiative, under the kingdom’s sovereignty, is wise and generous, and provides an honourable way out for all the parties.”

“[The Polisario] approach is useless, there is no point (for them) in continuing and they are no longer in the sense of history.”

It seems that French politicians love to talk about being part of history – Sarkozy has claimed that one of the problems with Africa is that “the African man has never really entered history“. Oh dear – despite the benefits of colonialism and the heroic attempts of Europe to civilise the benighted continent, not to mention all those fantastically well-conceived post-colonial development initiatives, those ungrateful Africans haven’t grasped the nettle of historical progress and lifted themselves “up” to the same level as Europe. What a pity Sarkozy doesn’t realise that ideas of historical progress are based on perversions of Darwinian evolutionary theory that have more to do with justifying racism and colonialism than they do with rational scientific enquiry. Unfortunately the dogma of historical progress is still used to justify aggression dressed up as the promotion and extension of civilisation – something else I’ve noticed in the arguments of those that support Rabat’s military push into the Sahara. But I digress.

Grosdidier also claims that the Western Sahara conflict is impairing international relations, and uses this as an argument for supporting the autonomy initiative. As I’ve argued on several previous occasions (e.g. here), this is indicative of a poor understanding of the the situation, as the autonomy plan does not address the reality of partition or the issue of the refugees around Tindouf – as if Morocco would welcome tens of thousands of independence-minded Sahrawi and make any real attempt to come to an agreement with the Polisario. Grosdidier says that “pluralism does not exist” in the camps, but I don’t see too much evidence of it in occupied Western Sahara either.

I sometimes wonder what drives certain European politicians (and I include the UK here) who seem so eager to offer their services to foreign governments, effectively acting as agents of foreign powers with little or no regard to the interests of the people whom they have been elected to serve. After Blair’s stint as Bush’s enforcer/poodle (delete according to your preference), which served only to support ill-conceived foreign policy adventures and increase risks to British citizens, some of us are a little annoyed with this sort of behaviour. Well, maybe it’s just the money, the power, the foreign junkets, or a simple messiah complex.

It’s not only politicians that are busy appeasing Moroccan aggression, and not only in Europe. I keep receiving news alerts from the African Press Agency (with the byline “Unity is in Truth”), based in Dakar, Senegal, which could have been written by the Moroccan interior ministry. A common theme is how so-and-so supports the autonomy initiative or hails Morocco’s commitment to solve the conflict. The border between Western Sahara and Morocco is conspicuous by its absence on the the maps on the APA website. Hell, they could even use a dashed line rather than a solid one if they wanted to reflect its unresolved status, but I suppose even that would be too much for their Moroccan friends.

Another unedifying spectacle is this love-in between the author and the outgoing Moroccan ambassador. Reading it is like watching two extremely ugly people make out in public – a nauseating experience which makes you think “is that really necessary?” (No offence intended to the extremely ugly by the way.)

The Lebanese Dar al-Hayat has also been at it, or at least one Mohammed el-Ashab has, writing in its pages. el-Ashab talks about the Sahrawi’s “popular reluctance to unite under one umbrella”, which he claims is the biggest obstacle to solving the conflict. So not the partition or the blocking of the referendum then? To cast the problem as one of divisions between the Sahrawi rather than one of invasion, occupation, displacement and partition is disingenuous to say the least. He also talks about “the cease-fire which classified the areas outside the security fence as buffer zones in which no military or civilian movement is allowed.” Well, actually, it didn’t. The buffer zone, into which neither side is allowed, extends for only 5km east and south of the berm, i.e. in the Polisario controlled areas. Restricted areas extend for 30km either side of the berm, and no arms are to be carried in these areas. Outside of the restricted areas are two vast “areas with limited restrictions” in which normal military activity is allowed with the exception of anything that would constitute a concentration of firepower. As I’ve pointed out before, these conditions of the ceasfire are set out on the MINURSO website, which Mohammed el-Ashab evidently has not bothered to examine before putting pen to paper, or fingers to keyboard. Not that he’s unusual in such uninformed pontificating (or is it deliberate misinformation?). Using elections as his theme, el-Ashab strives to convince us that everyone (the UN, the EU) is happy to see Morocco “practicing sovereignty in all its forms – including holding elections in all parts of the country since 1978”. I assume the country he is referring to is a putative greater Morocco which incorporates all of Western Sahara, although he doesn’t make it clear how Morocco has been or will be holding elections in the parts of Western Sahara that it doesn’t control. From his statement about “the frequent announcement of the “Polisario Front” that it operates in regions described as “liberated lands”” it seems that he might believe Morocco’s propaganda line that the Polisario doesn’t control any territory in Western Sahara, but this is not clear. I like the placing of “Polisario Front” in inverted commas – usually a sign of hostility.

There’s much more where all the above came from, and I’ll perodically highlight it. Of course if you want a real giggle you can always go to any number of websites whose purpose is to promote Moroccan interests and push pro-Morocco propaganda, such as that of the Morocco Board, the Moroccan-American Center for Policy, Maghreb Arabe Presse, CORCAS, or the dedicated anti-Polisario (and personal defamation) sites such as Polisario Confidential, Polisario Think Twice, Polisario Cannibals and Polisario Human Sacrifice. OK, I made the last two up, but those are about the only allegations that Morocco has not leveled at the Polisario.

All of this propaganda is designed to give the impression that the conflict is effectively over and that Moroccan control over Western Sahara is all but a done deal. The point of all the misinformation dissemminated by Morocco and its foreign toadies is to persuade people that all they have to do is endorse the situation on the ground and the issue of Western Sahara will go away, userhing in a new era of regional cooperation, development and progress. But of course it won’t, as long as Western Sahara remains partitioned and between 100,000 and 200,000 disaffected Sahrawi remain in camps in the inhospitable Algerian desert. Even if Morocco’s autonomy plan is officially endorsed by the likes of the EU, the USA and the UN, the reality on the ground will still poison the politics of the region. And the African Union still stands behind the Polisario and the Sahrawi’s right to self-determination. Morocco may be planning to further entrench its position by invading the Polisario controlled areas once its autonomy plan gets the green light from the world’s major political powers, but this is hardly likely to achieve the stated aims of all those foreign politicians and pundits who are so keen to promote autonomy in the name of progress.

Related link: http://w-sahara.blogspot.com/2008/09/polisario-confidential-goes-to.html (Western Sahara Info)

We welcome your unreasonable comments

Magharebia, a news site sponsored by the United States Africa Command, recently ran a story about the postponement of a planned march on Tifariti by the Moroccan “NGO” the Association Sahara Marocaine (“Sahara tension mounts as Tifariti march postponed“). The Magharebia story made the common mistake of confusing the buffer zone, which extends for 5 km either side of the berm that partitions Western Sahara, with the Polisario-controlled areas east and south of the Berm. This reflects the usual Moroccan rhetoric, which presents the Polisario areas as an official buffer zone rather than areas of Western Sahara that Morocco has failed to occupy, in which Morocco has no presence, and which are firmly controlled by a government with a competing claim to the territory. The confusion about the nature and extent of the buffer zone is common among journalists, so I thought I’d give Magharebia the benefit of the doubt, and point out their mistake. The site says that it welcomes comments, so I duly sent off a clarification, with links to MINRUSO maps showing the buffer zone, the berm and the Moroccan and Polisario-controlled areas. I pointed out that the (often overlooked) existence of the Polisario controlled areas has important implications for the viability of the Moroccan autonomy plan as a “solution” to the conflict.

As of today my comment has not been published [Note: see below for update]. However, this one has:

“truth: west sahara is moroccans and was moroccans and remains moroccans, we hope that tifariti and surroundings in as soon as possible conquered and free become, there is no other solution. political agression of algerian generals against morocco is total unacceptable, we hope that they think well after because they have two keys in hands them can choose between peace and war, we hope that they choose for peace, because war means a large calamity in north africa and surroundings. peace!”

So has another opposing comment, so full of cut and paste anti-American bile that it appears to be from a wannabe Jihadi sitting in his bedroom watching Osama videos, rather than a nationalist Sahrawi. Or perhaps it’s a put up job (maybe in the interest of balance?. Maybe it’s real, and an early indication that this festering conflict and the West’s support for Morocco is pushing some Sahrawi into the familiar territory of angry fundamentalism.

Anyway, it seems that you’re allowed to comment on this US military sponsored website if you’re a belligerent, ranting, hate-filled fundamentalist of whatever persuasion, but not if you’re someone with a valid and reasonably worded comment that takes issue with a misleading factual inaccuracy in one of Magharebia’s articles. I know I can be quite verbose, but I did stick within the word limit. I wonder if there is a political agenda here (surely not!). Morocco certainly doesn’t want anyone to know that there is a significant chunk of Western Sahara outside of its control. Now that the US has come out firmly in favour of Morocco’s partition – sorry, autonomy – plan, perhaps US military-sponsored news sites have been instructed to keep quiet about this matter too.

UPDATE: After I published the above entry my blog saw much more activity than usual (about 8 times the normal number of hits, with plenty of time still to go before the day is out). I’ve just checked the article on the Magharebia website and my comment has now been published. The comment was submitted 5 days ago, and has been published some time after comments submitted 4 and 2 days ago. A number of other comments submitted 4 days ago have also been published today (18 March 2008). Anyway, whether these comments have been “released” in response to this post, or whether the delay was just due to a glitch or distracted moderator, it’s good to see them there.

Of all the 8 comments currently visible on the site, one is mine, one is a request for impartiality in the administration of the site, one is pro-Sahrawi, and the remaining 5 are pro-Moroccan. Interestingly, one of the pro-Moroccan comments accuses the Algerian authorities of “playing the game of the Zionists”. So Israel has been dragged into this by both sides in these comments (see also the one pro-Sahrawi comment, which is rather belligerent, but it is hardly alone in this respect). Neither of these (pro- nor anti-Moroccan) comments acknowledges the fact that, as part of a mutual back-scratching agreement between Morocco and Israel, there is an understanding that Israel will help to promote Moroccan interests. The author of the pro-Moroccan post who attacks Algeria for being like “the Zionists” might want to rethink his comments and take a more positive position regarding this new Moroccan ally.

Journalism in support of occupation

The May 31st edition of Spiegel Online carries an article by Daniel Steinvorth with the title “Peace for the Big Sandbox: Western Sahara Eyes a Hopeful Future”, which extols the virtues of Morocco’s “autonomy” plan for the territory it invaded in 1975. This article is worth some comment in the context of Morocco’s ongoing push to gain acceptance for its autonomy proposals, which it has been touting around the world’s capitals for the past few months. Morocco’s allies across the globe have been mobilizing to explain the virtues of normalizing Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara, a region designated by the United Nations as a “non self-governing territory” whose status is yet to be determined, and where the issue is one of decolonization. The UN has declared that the future of Western Sahara should be determined by a referendum which includes the option of full independence for its inhabitants.

For some time now the Polisario independence movement, based in the little discussed “Free Zone” and headquatered in the Sahrawi refugee camps in neighbouring Algeria, has endorsed the idea of a referendum offering a choice between full integration into the Moroccan state, autonomy within a greater Morocco, or full independence. Morocco is now receiving much praise for offering a referendum on the future of Western Sahara, but the Moroccan plan does not include the independence option. Since the UN brokered a ceasefire in 1991 its observer force, known by its acronym MINURSO, has been ostensibly trying to organise a referendum on self determination, as required by UN Security Council resolutions 621 of 1988 and 690 of 1991. “Ostensibly” because, according to some observers, MINURSO and the UN have taken a somewhat indulgent position towards Morocco, which has engaged in obfuscation regarding arguments over voter eligibility (1). Morocco has done everything in its power to prolong the stalemate as it digs itself in behind the 1500 mile long wall of defensive earthworks (known locally as the Berm) with which it has partitioned Western Sahara, in order to keep the Polisario out of the areas it occupies. Morocco has also encouraged poor Moroccans to settle in occupied Western Sahara, offering financial incentives to those prepared to relocate. Some 200,000 or more settlers (plus some 160,000 troops) now outnumber the approximately 90,000 indigenous Sahrawi who remained in the territory after the Moroccan invasion.

So, what does Speigel Online writer Steinvorth have to say about the prospects for this divided territory, in which the principle of self-determination has been systematically undermined for so long? The article opens by introducing us to the Mayor of el-Ayoun, a member of “The Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs” who, we are told, was instrumental in developing the autonomy plan. The Mayor gushes about how autonomy will solve all the territory’s problems and end the conflict between Morocco and the Polisario independence movement. Of course the Royal Advisory Council was set up by Morocco and is populated by Sahrawi living in the occupied territories who are sympathetic to the Moroccan position. While some Sahrawi living in occupation do see the most sensible option as integration with or limited autonomy within Morocco, many more do not, as apparent from frequent clashes between Sahrawi protestors and Moroccan police and security forces in occupied Western Sahara and also in Morocco itself.

Above a map showing the faintest of borders between Morocco and Western Sahara, Steinvorth tells us of the Green March, during which “350,000 subjects of then King Hassan II, armed with nothing but the green flags of Islam”, laid claim to the Western Sahara by marching into it from Morocco. Nothing is said of the parallel military invasion of the territory, during which tens of thousands of people were displaced into neighbouring Algeria. Survivors of this migration tell of how the Moroccan air force used napalm on fleeing refugees. The displaced Sahrawi still live in camps in the Algerian desert, whose population has been estimated by a number of independent bodies at somewhere between 160,000 and 200,000 (more of this later).

There follows an airing of the views of Moroccan Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa, who, we are told, believes that the question of who should have sovereignty over Western Sahara is “the wrong question to ask.” Thanks for putting us straight on that one. Benmoussa repeats the often heard claim that the Sahara is a nest of terrorism, full of terrorist training camps and a conduit for terrorist weapons. We are told that European security is at stake, that European and American diplomats believe that Morocco can contribute to regional stability, and that “Western intelligence agencies believe that the no-man’s land between Algeria, Mali and Mauritania is a haven for Islamist terrorists.” The author then tells us that the same agencies believe that an independent Western Sahara “might be too weak to protect itself against terrorism emanating from the region.”

So there we have it, spelled out for us loud and clear. For the sake of international security we have to normalise Morocco’s occupation and annexation of a large swathe of a neighbouring territory, and ignore UN resolutions and the principle of self-determination. In short, we have to endorse a new phase of colonialism in Africa in order to secure our own safety. The argument that Moroccan aggression should be rewarded in the name of fighting the War on Terror is heard a lot from Morocco and its foreign apologists (2), and is worth some comment.

For some time, western intelligence agencies have been concerned that the “empty spaces” of the Sahara might provide a haven for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The US is so concerned that it has sent troops to the region to help governments fight “terrorism” and secure their borders (a move that isn’t so beneficial for the pastoralists whose livelihoods involve regular informal border crossings in search of water and pasture).

However, the terrorist bogey in the Sahara appears to be essentially non-existent. While all North African countries have wrestled with militant “Islamism”, this has largely involved home-grown groups bent on overthrowing domestic governments. In Algeria’s case, Islamist terrorism was part of what was essentially a civil war precipitated by the annulment of election results that the Algerian military and the West didn’t like. This conflict played itself out mostly in the heavily populated Mediterranean coastal region, leaving the vast area of southern, Saharan Algeria largely unscathed. Even at the hight of Algeria’s troubles tourists were travelling in relative safety in the south. The more recent kidnapping of a group of German tourists in southern Algeria appears to have had nothing to do with terrorism, and is more likely to have been a political stunt aimed at justifying western support for “anti-terrorist” measures (requiring financial and material support) in Algeria. The author and North African expert Jeremy Keenan has written extensively on the exploitation of the “War on Terror” by North African governments, who have been conjuring up the Saharan terrorist bogey in order to secure military and financial aid. The Sahara has its share of bandits and smugglers, and when you hear about a terrorist incident in the Sahara the chances are that it involved a shoot-out between government forces and petty criminals, or that it was a put-up job by a North African government intent on scaring the west into providing it with money or weapons. The one place where these kinds of incidents are unheard of is actually the so-called “Free Zone” – the part of Western Sahara under the control of the Polisario (and in which the author of this blog has travelled extensively).

The Spiegel article goes on to tell us that Spain is eager to work with Morocco because of concerns about illegal migrants, many of whom cross Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Morocco routinely dumps illegal migrants in the desert in Western Sahara on the other side of its wall. These migrants (if they survive the desert) are picked up by the Polisario and accommodated until they can be repartriated (we met some migrants in this situation in November 2005, during fieldwork in the Free Zone). So much for cooperation with the Moroccan authorities in the name of sustainable and just solutions to the “problem” of migration.

Steinvorth then cites another Sahrawi member of the Royal Advisory Council, Brahim Laghzal, as stating that “Morocco, under its current king, is on a democratic path, and this [the autonomy plan] is our opportunity…. Autonomy is the only solution, as demonstrated by the Basques in Europe, the Catalans, the Scots and the Southern Tyroleans!” I’d be interested to hear from any Basques, Catalans or Scots to see if they think that their own versions of autonomy within a larger nation state have solved all their problems. This particular Sahrawi obviously hasn’t been following the electoral process in the UK, where the pro-independence Scottish National Party won a slim majority in recent Scottish parliamentary elections, catapulting their leader into the position of First Minister. Steinforth tells us that “He [Laghzal] believes that the separatists have gotten carried away and that the liberation movement, which was founded during the Cold War, has few democratic elements.” This is a subtle and juicy sentence that presses a number of buttons designed to make us feel less well-disposed towards the Polisario, and therefore to the idea of full independence. First, Steinvorth describes the Polisario as separatists, a term commonly deployed by the pro-Moroccan camp to suggest that the Polisario represent a troublesome minority who want to break away from an existing sovereign state. The reality is somewhat different – the Polisario existed before the Moroccan invasion, having fought the former Spanish colonial administration, and is an organisation dedicated to opposing a military invasion and annexation by an aggressive and expansionist neighbour with imperial ambitions. They are about as separatist as were the French resistance in World War II. Steinvorth goes on to tell us that the Polisario was founded during the cold war, clearly suggesting by association that the organisation is an anachronism, and perhaps attempting to associate the Polisario with communism. This is another common tactic of pro-Moroccan propagandists, who like to emphasise the links between the Polisario and Cuba – some pro-Moroccan groups in the United States go as far as claiming that Sahrawi children who have travelled to Cuba for their education have been “kidnapped by communists“. The third button Steinvorth presses in this sentence is the claim that the Polisario has few democratic elements, as opposed to Morocco, which his interviewee claims is on the path to democracy – “under its current king”. Whatever the democractic virtues or vices of the Polisario (which does at least claim to aspire to democratic national politics), this is somewhat rich – Morocco may have undertaken a process of reform, but the king retains absolute power and the nation will remain a hereditary monarchy. Hardly a good format for democracy. The flawed democracy that is the United Kingdom may have a monarch as its head of state, but at least day-to-day power is invested in elected representatives, even if these representatives do behave in a less than democratic manner once in power. The role of the Moroccan monarchy is more like that of the Saudi Monarchy (with which it has close links) than the constitutional monarchy of the UK. In recent months, Morocco’s reforming instincts have led it to ban YouTube, Google Earth and LiveJournal. Censoring of web access in Morocco seems to be driven by concerns that Moroccans might access material that is critical of the king or of the government’s policies on Western Sahara. The path to democracy is obviously a rocky one.

The role of Morocco in “modernizing” Western Sahara through investment is briefly mentioned, before we are treated to another Benmoussa quote in which he asks rhetorically “What is a Sahrawi?” This implicit questioning of the Sahrawi identity echoes the more forceful assertions by the Moroccan government and its foreign supporters that there is no such thing as a Sahrawi, and that the Sahrawi “identity” is a fabrication by a small group of “separatists”. Steinvorth, apparently paraphraasing Benmoussa, points out that the Sahrawi traditionally have been nomadic, wandering over an area that now straddles the borders of several countries in north-west Africa. The implication seems to be that as the Sahrawi are traditionally nomads, and did not concern themselves with national borders prior to 1975, it would be inappropriate for them now to have their own nation state. This seems peculiar given that across the world, hundreds of millions of people whose societies existed outside the context of the nation state for centuries or millennia, prior to the imposition of national borders by colonial and post-colonial governments, are now expected to live happily within those borders.

Towards the end of his article, Steinvorth erroneously cites the number of refugees in the Sahrawi camps around the Algerian town of Tindouf as 90,000. The number of refugees in the camps has been estimated by a number of independent bodies as at least 165,000, with some estimates as high as 200,000. 90,000 is the downgraded number of people “of concern” to the World Food Programme (i.e. requiring food aid) as of 2006. A senior member of a major international NGO told me late last year that she thought the WFP had reduced its figure as an excuse to cut food aid as a result of pressure from donors, who are using this aid as a political tool to pressure the Polisario into accepting Morocco’s autonomy plan (see earlier post on this topic). If this interpretation is correct, the WFP seems to be trying to starve the Sahrawi refugees out of the camps for political purposes, in support of an act of military aggression by one country against it’s neighbours (more evidence of Morocco’s diplomatic influence with key UN member states). The WFP figure of 90,000 people of concern is turning up in a lot of articles as representing the total number of people in the camps, either as a result of deliberate misinformation or sloppy research. Morocco certainly plays down the number of refugees, usually citing a figure of around 40,000. It is certainly in Morocco’s interest to downplay the number of people in the camps, just as it is to refer to the unoccupied territories of Western Sahara (known to the Sahrawi as the “Free Zone”) as its “buffer zone”, when it mentions this region at all. If only the refugees and the Polisario-controlled territories would disappear then Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara would be so much easier. Normalisation of this annexation by friendly western powers would also be much more straightforward with no refugee problem or messy geographical partitioning to complicate the issue and throw the hypocrisy of Morocco’s “freedom and democracy” loving western allies into sharp relief.

Steinvorth does make the effort to appear even-handed, acknowledging torture and corruption on the part of Morocco and giving some space to the Polisario point of view. However, after the errors of fact and omission described above, and the extensive and sympathetic treatment of the Moroccan point of view, he ends his article with the following statement:

“For many, the idea that the roughly 90,000 refugees in Tindouf will ever return to an independent desert state is only an illusion. Over in Ajun, Mayor Uld al-Rashid is already preparing for the post-Polisario days.”

With this closing statement Steinvorth is asserting that the future of Western Sahara is a Moroccan one, under the autonomy plan that denies the Sahrawi the right to full self determination, ignores the pronouncements of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, and runs counter to the position of the African Union. His article may not be as intemperate a statement of support for Morocco as the blatantly propagandist 2005 report from the Belgium-based European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre, which presents many of the arrguments in the Speigel article much more forcefully. However, Steinvorth’s contribution seems to be part of the snowballing pro-Morocco propaganda campaign to prepare the citizens of Europe for the betrayal of the Sahrawi people in the name of political expediency and the dubious, fatuous “War of Terror”.

The endorsement of Morocco’s occupation will not make Europe safer, but will merely entrench an undemocratic and repressive regime that governs a country in which home-grown religious extremism is growing, fuelled by oppression, poverty and marginalisation. Unless Morocco is assisted in extending its occupation of Western Sahara into the Free Zone and dispersing or eliminating the Sahrawi refugees currently stuck in camps in Algeria, the normalisation of its occupation will not do anything to extend Moroccan control into the “empty space” of the Sahara where non-existent terrorists are said to be plotting the downfall of western civilisation. Assiting Morocco to extend its control into parts of the Sahara over which it currently has no jurisdiction (legal or otherwise) must by definition involve the fueling of armed conflict at best, and the endorsement of genocide at worst. Rewarding Morocco’s aggression by simply recognising its existing occupation will do nothing except increase the sense of desperation and hopelessness of the exiled Sahrawi, who will more than likely insist on taking up arms once again. However Morocco is rewarded for its imperial expansion, the result will not be an increase in regional stability, but an increase in regional tension and a likely return to conflict. With the inevitable influx of arms into the region in the event of renewed conflict, and the potential radicalisation of another group of people from whom hope has been snatched by political “realism”, this part of the Sahara will certainly be destabilised. Perhaps then the threat to international security will be real.

(1) Given that the UN is to a large extent simply the sum of its member states, and that UN policies and actions are determined by the interaction of its member states as they pursue their own interests, the lack of pressure on Morocco to agree to a free and fair referendum including the option of independence in Western Sahara is perhaps not surprising – Morocco has a lot more diplomatic clout than the Polisario.

(2) As a result of an agreement between Morocco and Israel to promote each other’s interests, a number of highly effective pro-Israeli lobby groups have now joined the propaganda war on the side of Morocco.